THE FORTNIGHTLY

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WAYS OF PEACE IN ITALY

By KARL WALTER

FOR most Italians, Italy is now just part of the hinterland of a German south-eastern front, drawn upon for men, arms and supplies like other conquered and vassal countries; still in e war, but no longer as a partner. They expect us to break up at front; and, of all consequences of this, their main interest lies the question of how soon thereafter the Germans will be driven er the Alps. Whether they help us in either of these tasks will pend upon our moral influence as well as our military strength. difference to the major issues, even in the climax of the war, was be expected in a country whose dictator has lost or given away ery card he held for war or peace.

Driblets of personal news from Italy colour the public impression a people turning to seek the ways of peace in their daily lives, tting as far away from the war as possible. "As much as we n we are making a life as you knew it." Young men known to ve been in the forces are named in surprising number as enjoying rmal employment. Unhappy children born and bred pro-British e now "getting on very well in every way" at school. Friends vided by the war "are reconciled"—and certainly not by admir- on of Mussolini. Former British and American residents receive inted messages. "The house is ready whenever the signori are ady to return." Other residents who had been interned are living their villas again. "We are expecting you . . . ."

A new phase in the endurance of increasing hardships is indicated the official voices of press and radio. The exhortations are no nger against defeatism; all Italians know they lost their war ainst France by a too tardy intervention, and against Greece and eat Britain by ordeal of arms. For many, this is the eve of ace; they have passed beyond the defeatist phase into a twilight nonbelligerent indifference. For others, it is the eve of disaster d chaos, and they rage against that indifference, fearing what may ring at them out of the dusk, chained to their German masters.

In these circumstances at least one current of Italian thought, nstant in its direction, may be traced with some confidence even ere it has gone underground. To some of her public men and

lesser officials whom I know as well as I know my own kin, Italy's future place among the nations will to-day be worth only a shrug of the shoulders, and the fate of the régime a rude noise. But the indifference will not extend to those institutions of the régime upon which so largely depend the orderly economic ways of peace and above all the social security which was steadily being won by the workers. Just as we have reason to believe that among the masses there is to-day a strong tendency to seek the ways of peace, so we may assume, from previous knowledge guided by passing indications, that these men, their leaders in all that has been social and constructive in recent years, will be looking for ways of civil peace and social order through the coming period of political disruption. That is where we must be prepared to meet them, being indeed pledged to meet them in these ways by the declarations of the Atlantic Charter.

The problem of Italy's future and our relations with her in a new world order is not faced by those who think the destruction of Fascism will solve it. We cannot foresee what will happen to a country which has lived for so many years enclosed in totalitarianism, as in an iron lung. But a necessary process of any order or reconstruction, we may be sure, will be the disentanglement of useful public institutions from the intricate network of the Fascist régime. Whether this is to take place under a monarchical or republican system is not our concern; the question comes under that article of the Atlantic Charter which declares the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live, and the less we say about it the better. In any case, compared with questions of their economic existence and social security, that of the House of Savoy is of little interest to the Italian people.

The Fascist Party is quite a different proposition, as part of the present constitution of the realm, or as a candidate for survival among the social institutions of the country. Among its civil functions there is nothing that could not be done better by other agencies; in any case they are secondary to its military character and purpose, which condemn it to abolition under the disarmament article of the Charter, even if it survive defeat. The Party is not so much, as it is sometimes pictured, the cement which binds together the institutions of the régime, as the stucco surface which gives the building its totalitarian appearance.

The first and most obvious step in reconstruction, disentanglement from the Party, was already desired and, as much as possible, practised before the war by the social leaders of Italy whom we envisage to-day as looking to the ways of peace. They had built

p a great system of labour organization and social services, whose
naterial achievements many a democrat would envy while deplor-
ng, as many members of it did, its political servitude. They had
aken pride in preserving some of the rudimentary principles of
reedom in its ranks and minor offices, necessarily submitting to
he constitutional obligation of party membership for major
ppointments, whether by election or nomination. The growing
opularity and influence of their confederations, particularly that
f the industrial workers, compared with the decadence of the
'ascist Party, in the later thirties, was their special—and not
lways secret—pride. They rejected insistent German proposals
–for instance, for a propaganda exchange in 1938; and various
ncidents marked their resistance to the Hunnish invasion, includ-
ng the expulsion of Dr. Ley's representative for being too un-
leasantly German and aggressive. When the Germans later
nsinuated themselves into strategic positions everywhere in Rome,
he labour officials who had opposed them were removed from con-
act with them, but were not disgraced. Most of them retained
ome official position connected with labour and social services.
'o-day, and unquestionably tomorrow, their aim will be to pre-
erve these institutions and adapt them to the conditions of a new
égime.

There are and will be divisions of opinion on the old ideological
nes, and on others unforeseeable. Some so blindly hate the word
hat they will want to destroy everything that ever bore the name
f Fascist and tear twenty pages out of Italian history. The label
as indeed been plastered over everything; but in many cases it is
o more than a label. To abolish every institution which is called
'ascist to-day would be to create a chaos in which the people
vould look back to their present oppressed but orderly existence
s to a golden age. At best it would mean reverting to the very
onditions which produced Fascism, and nobody in Italy wants to
o back to that, ignoring the often bitter but not always unprofit-
ble lessons of these years. Least of all do they want to go back
o the turmoil of labour conflict, whatever may be their political
spirations. A peaceful method of determining labour conditions
nd dealing with labour disputes has been in operation now for
ixteen years. A labour-capital equilibrium has been maintained by
neans of collective contract-laws jointly negotiated and written
y the syndical representatives of the workers and the employers
nd passed by them to the executive government for promulgation.
'he procedure, dependent upon the parallel institutions of the two
nterests, has allowed the workers to win a position which, in some

material respects, is more privileged than that of British and American workers.

The institutions in question are to-day labelled Fascist, but there is nothing peculiarly Fascist in the method of peaceful labour relations or in the abolition of strikes and lockouts. The collective agreements of some of our own trade unions have the same general application to all shops and workers in a trade, and to make those agreements enforceable by law, as many good democrats believe desirable, we also should have to surrender the appeal to force.

The industrial peace which the country has enjoyed through the syndical institutions, and the advantages to both interests directly concerned, will be strong reasons for their conservation. But there are weightier reasons to which the labour leaders can appeal for the preservation of their own organizations. A free vote of the workers on that issue would show an overwhelming majority in favour of their continuance under a new régime. For, besides their function as pressure organizations, the syndicates are trustees for various funds in which every worker has some interest—savings, insurances, pensions and other equities, such as the solid indemnity payable to every worker on dismissal according to length of employment. The worker who counts on this—and therefore especially the steady worker—will not favour the abolition of the institution which assures it.

Another working-class motive of conservation will be to retain control of the labour exchanges. This was won by the labour confederations after a long and obstinate fight which was none the less to the credit of their leaders because of its limited publicity—everybody in the organizations knew what was going on and how bitterly it was contested by the employers. Just as popular as this privilege are the health services of the unions. The relative importance attributed to these in the syndical world is well indicated architecturally in the new headquarters many of the provincial unions have built for themselves, in which the whole of the ground floor is devoted to health, on a scale to provide for an annual preventive overhaul of every worker and every curative treatment the rich man can buy, with the labour exchange on the next floor, and above them the contracts department and other offices. Other welfare activities, including free legal aid, are part of the syndical system; and every provincial union, as well as the confederations, has a research department to equip it for negotiations and to brief its representatives for the increasing part they were taking in the direction of industry.

None of this is due to the Fascist Party; much of it has been

achieved in spite of the Party. Abolition of the Party would have little or no effect on any of these social and economic amenities, and need have none. The appreciable change would be in the greater freedom which the electoral system of the syndicates would enjoy, limited as it was yesterday and evidently in abeyance to-day. The most important and indeed vital difference which severance from the present régime would bring, would be that the administrative heads of the confederations, instead of being chosen from a panel by a *Duce* and being ex-officio members of the Fascist Grand Council, would be elected outright by the councils of the confederations (the representatives of the national federations) and would take whatever place in government might be assigned to them under a new régime. Collaboration between the trade unions and the state is attained by us in a different manner, but in a country where it has been established for so many years a formal connection may be expected to continue.

Among the employers, the motive of conservation has not such a broad basis. Their syndicates are essentially pressure organizations and have few ramifications of a social order. Fascism in its earlier stages was their creed to a much greater degree than in the labour organizations, where opinion and aims have always been influenced by their ideological inheritance from the old syndicalist movement. As Fascism revealed its National Socialist character, however, with all the centralization and state interference which this implies, the employers turned with some hope of relief to the development of corporations, jointly with the labour syndicates. At one time the project of a corporative state looked as if it might leave Fascism behind, as some of its more ardent propagandists predicted; but this eventuality was countered when the central body of the corporations was established, by making it a Chamber of Corporations and *Fasci*. With the *Fasci* excluded, Italy might yet have a corporative economy under a liberal régime, as some of the leaders on both sides desire.

But whether or not the corporative practice is deeply enough rooted to survive, anyone in Italy with a constructive or reconstructive mind, and used to responsibility, in looking to the ways of peace will be looking for the conservation of the labour syndicates and their social services as an essential part of the apparatus of society. Without their influence as natural instruments of public order—in upholding the standard of living of the workers and providing them with the sense and some substance of social security—it is difficult to imagine anything but a catastrophic emergence from totalitarianism—civil war, or at best a violent and

reactionary scramble for regional power. For the authority c the appointed provincial and municipal governors will lapse wit the breakdown of Rome. The local gangsters of the *Fasci* wi find themselves stranded like German "hedgehogs"; they wi fight under leaders who will not scruple to use any device that ma serve. Experienced leadership against them is only to be foun within the present social system, whatever may later emerge fro the political exiles who have endured at home or the scores c absentee candidates who have kept the banner of the ideal flyin in England and America. The leaders of the labour syndicates ca muster a disciplined force against the gangsters; in recent year they have shown on more than one occasion that they can succes fully meet the Fascists in the violent encounters of the piazz And it may be noted, to complete this speculative excursion, tha the same conflicting tendencies mark the land forces—syndicalis in the regular conscript army, and gangsterism in the Blackshi legions.

We return to less speculative premises when we consider how th syndical system which has been outlined should be regarded in th light of the Atlantic Charter, steady beacon for our ways of peac however diffuse its beams. The guiding principle in it expresse the Anglo-American

> desire to bring about fullest collaboration between all nations in th economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standard economic advancement, and social security.

No serious public comment on the Charter was to be expected i Fascist Italy, where nearly all progressive talk and planning wer unreported or took place in private even in the days of peace. I this way, however, it will have been discussed, the military an political principles of it, but especially the implications of th article quoted. The objects we avow in it, the progressive leade of syndicalism will have noted, are those which they have at hear and for which their institutions are devised. And they will b wondering whether we yet realize that it is to them we shall hav to turn, perhaps in a night, if future collaboration is to be of an avail.

The climax of the war brings nearer the challenge to our pr paredness for the ways of peace to which the Charter points. I may be objected by those who perhaps do not like the sweepin terms of its economic profession, that collaboration is to come onl when "all nations" shall have entered a new defined and codifie economic order. With Italy, let us hope, and not with Italy alon there will be a more propitious approach, that collaboration ma be an organic growth whose first experiences will justify an

acilitate a progressive application of the humanitarian economics f the Charter. One such approach suggests itself for countries vhich, like Italy, will be not only bankrupt but hungry and politic- lly perplexed. Relief will be the first business of collaboration. f it is extended through such native agencies as the workers' own rganizations, relief might be reconstructional, in effect, as well s charitable, adding to the domestic prestige of the institutions vhich dispense it, and to ours as discriminating foreigners in hoosing them. Such action would also set at rest, once and for ll, the question in many continental minds, rather exploited than nplanted there by the "plutodemocracy" propaganda, whether ve are on the side of the people, whether we are in earnest about a ew deal for all the peoples of the world. We can effectively dis- ose of the pseudo-proletarianism of Fascism only by making this onvincingly clear. In Italy particularly we shall need to strike he right note in this regard from the earliest moment of renewed elations. Nowhere else, except in Russia, shall we be watched vith such critical eyes, because nowhere in the world has the ivision between employers and workers been so systematically lefined for so many years; and whatever the form of a new régime, rganized labour will have something more than a half share in it.

What is expedient and right for tomorrow has a present aspect. A discriminatory view of the future is equally desirable in our ttitude to-day. We must not underestimate the intelligence or he diversity of opinion which lie behind the artificial veil of totali- arianism. One object of effective political warfare is to propagate n the mind of its enemy public a prospect of defeat that seems olerable; to include all the institutions of Italy among those we ntend to add to her historical ruins will not serve that purpose. Only a few Anarchists there would welcome starting all over again rom the second verse of Genesis, free from the fear of a national lisaster that would make their country "without form, and void." Recent observers report that this fear is general, and in a country vithout any visible alternative administration it would have the ffect of prolonging the war much more than elsewhere. We do ıot want to eliminate that fear, but to polarize it, intensifying it ımong those men and institutions we mean to destroy, whose end vill benefit their country, but minimizing it where we can encour- ıge or implant the hope of survival after defeat, where survival eems possible and desirable for the public welfare.

We ought to be picking the Fascist régime to pieces, not in rage, ıut with discrimination for what is bad in it and what may be good, or what is doomed and what may endure. We are not doing this, ıs anyone knows who has listened to our Italian broadcasting long

enough to have a fair knowledge of its character. When we gi
the news or talk about ourselves it is well up to B.B.C. standarc
but the best of our commentary on Italian affairs runs in fine
worded sarcastic periods and sentiments reminiscent of a bygo
age, or sounds like Italian refugees deservedly enough, we m
think, " getting a bit of their own back." Talks of British authc
ship about Italy have been mostly historical or sentimental or bot
and for comment on Italian problems of to-day and tomorro
instead of analysis and suggestion, they favour the refugee bia
" The émigré," wrote Sir Ernest Benn to *The Times* shortly befo
the war, " is, of course, afflicted with a bias, and cannot be an age
of peace and understanding." And this is just as true in these da
of general affliction if we are to insinuate a desire for peace a
understanding into the Italian mind. The desire is there, wid
spread, among the simple people and those who are unchangeab
our friends. But those who are in a better position to influen
events need to be shown, by our understanding of their proble
and our respect for their vital institutions, that we are as much
earnest about the benevolent declarations of the Atlantic Chart
as we are about the wholesome severity of its military prospectu
Recently I came across the following in a syndicated article b
Michael Chinigo, International News Service correspondent, o
of the last American newsmen to leave Italy:

> Before I left Italy popular leaders and many Italian officials who a
> Fascist by profession only, praised the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Chart
> But they wondered, and assured me that millions of Italians are wonderi
> to-day, just how the Atlantic Charter will apply to their country and
> them, individually.

THE BURMA TRAGEDY AND CHINA

By O. M. Green

WITH the loss of Lashio and Mandalay positional fighting in Burma appears to be, at least temporarily, at an end. Heroically as the Allied troops have fought, enduring such hardships of heat, hunger and thirst as only those can dimly imagine who know how intolerable the climate of Burma can be even when mitigated with copious ice and electric fans, the odds against them were too great. They never had more than a handful of aeroplanes and these, as a study of the telegrams suggests, only intermittently; while the overwhelming numbers of the Japanese were further aided by active Burmese fifth columnists.

How much more of Burma will have gone before these lines are in print one can only gloomily speculate. Both General Alexander and the Chungking military spokesman have already forecast a stage of guerrilla fighting while the Allied nations work up to their full strength. But the inhospitable nature of so much of the northern Burma terrain and the difficulty of obtaining supplies from India does not make this a very hopeful prospect. It is a sad climax to one of the saddest chapters in British history.

What makes matters worse is the feeling which will not be denied that it need never have happened, notwithstanding the burden of Great Britain's responsibilities elsewhere, if greater forethought and imagination had been shown, particularly in making use of the Chinese armies. Once the Japanese had penetrated into Malaya the vital importance of striking at their rear and their communications with Thailand along the Kra peninsula leapt to the eye. That it was perfectly feasible to do so was shown by the ease with which the Japanese crossed the mountains, seized another aerodrome and established themselves firmly in Lower Burma. We could do nothing because, as since revealed, we never had more than a few hundred troops in Lower Burma. It remains a mystery why we did not redress the balance by calling upon China's help which would have been readily, even eagerly given. The unlimited man-power of China is proverbial, and to judge by the quantities of arms thrown away in Singapore (which, as all who know the

island agree, was never defensible against a serious attack from th land side) we could have supplied them with the necessar materials. As Asiatics themselves, the Chinese would always b more skilful than Western troops in detecting Burmese renegade or disguised Japanese, of whose tricks, moreover, they have ha nearly five years' experience. The Chinese soldier is essentiall an individualist, who is at his best when thrown upon his ow resources and in native ingenuity he is more than equal to Japanese. Yet even after the Chinese troops had entered Burma considerable time passed before any use seems to have been mad of them. It is a grave thing to say but there have been man indications, small in themselves but in the aggregate formidabl of a tendency in London to undervalue the Chinese as a fightin race and their enormous importance in the struggle with Japa The War Office never, so far as can be ascertained, thought it wort while to send out officers to watch the Chinese methods in copin with Japan in China, and to that may be attributed much of wha has happened in Burma. We began by underestimating Japan an certainly we appear to have been equally at fault in our estimat of China.

The loss of Burma will not have been wholly in vain if it serve to correct this bad judgment, as assuredly it should do. For eve through the arid wording of official *communiqués*, it is clear tha the Chinese have fought magnificently in Burma, and the name "Tounggoo," "Yenangyaung" and "Taunggyi" (though th ultimate outcome was less happy) deserve no less meritorious place in their history than Taierchuang and Changsha.* A Tounggoo 7,000 Chinese, with no air protection, kept at bay a who Japanese division, and only when all their food and ammunitio were spent did they withdraw in good order. At Yenangyaun the Chinese, having marched thirty-five miles under high pressur flung themselves into the battle and recaptured the position, thu contributing notably to the extrication of a considerable Britis force which the Japanese had got behind. And Taunggyi th Chinese recaptured on April 26 after two days' fighting, an in portant success at the time though it was neutralized by the su sequent rapid advance of the Japanese armoured column throug the Shan States upon Lashio.

These achievements, scored not only against much superi numbers but against Japan's almost unchallenged command of th

*At Taierchuang in May, 1938, the Chinese inflicted the first square defeat on Jap that she had ever suffered and wiped out two Japanese divisions. The Chinese victory Changsha last October—the third within 12 months at the same place—is no doubt reme bered by most readers.

air, ought to convince the most doubting Thomas not only of the Chinese fighting qualities, but of the vast progress they have made in military science in the last five years. The southern provinces, Kuangsi, Kuangtung, Hunan and Yunnan and the northern provinces of Honan and Shantung produce fighting men as good probably as are to be found in any country: incidentally, they are to be counted in many millions. But until the present war soldiering ranked very low in Chinese estimation, the lowest place in fact in the four traditional orders of society—scholars, merchants, farmers and soldiers; and of military science and training and a properly organized corps of officers there was little or none.

When Japan invaded China in July, 1937, General Chiang Kai-shek, with the aid of the German military advisers whom he had engaged in 1929, had built up an army of 300,000 men, known as "the Generalissimo's Own," which, though short of equipment as compared with the Japanese, were fully equal to them in other respects and proved it in their heroic defence of Shanghai in the autumn of 1937. But the bulk of the Chinese armies, though showing great personal bravery, were in no respect to be reckoned equals to the Japanese. The troops of Sung Cheh-yuan during the first encounters with the invader around Peking and Tientsin stood their ground against overwhelming metal and fought and died like heroes. But in equipment, training and leadership they were hopelessly outmatched. The wonder is that they inflicted so much damage on the Japanese as they did, particularly in the fighting for the passes through the Great Wall and from Hopei into Shansi, where the famous guerrillas of the Eighth Route (Communist) Army first came into action and the Japanese lost a great many men and suffered one decidedly expensive setback on the border of Shansi.

To-day the Chinese say that they have 5,000,000 men under arms, of whom 2,000,000 are in the field, another 2,000,000 in reserve and training, and 1,000,000 are represented by the guerrillas. These numbers are probably no exaggeration considering China's vast population, though it seems scarcely possible that the equipment of all is equal to that of the best. The constitution of the armies is peculiar to China. There are "the Generalissimo's Own," the Government army, and the provincial armies. Loyalties among Chinese troops have always been directed rather to particular leaders than to the State as a whole, and the Kuangsi mountaineers, who are perhaps the hardiest soldiers in China, still largely regard themselves as the troops of the two famous Kuangsi Generals, Pai Chung-hsi, General Chiang's Chief of Staff, and Li Tsung-jen, whom they adore. But this sentiment makes no difference to the

unity in action of the whole force, for the simple reason that all t peoples of China for the first time thoroughly understand wh they are fighting for and are truly united in resistance. Th question is sometimes asked: "How far are the old warlords harmony with General Chiang?" The answer is simply, "All them." The two Kuangsi Generals just mentioned are a conspic ous example; they fought furiously against Chiang in 1929 a very nearly did so again in 1936; but to-day he has no abler more ardent lieutenants. The quisling Wang Ching-wei, head the Nanking puppet government, has never been able to attra to himself a single Chinese of any standing. That the Japane have been able to enrol some puppet troops in the occupied are is merely an example of Chinese common-sense philosophy. The men argue that they have families to support and that it is definite better for Chinese territory to be policed by Chinese troops than Japanese: when sent out against the guerrillas they fire in the a There is an authentic case of puppet troops, who had accidenta killed some guerrillas, sending a messenger to the guerrilla lead to express their profound regret for this wholly unintentional m fortune. Recently two considerable bodies of puppet troops, all about 10,000 men, have killed their Japanese officers and go over to the Government. More of this sort of thing may be expecte and once the Chinese armies are equipped to start a big counte offensive the puppet troops will turn upon the Japanese as one ma

Two respects in which perhaps the most marked improveme has been made are in the officering of the forces and the timing movements. General Chiang, who sixteen years ago at t Whampoa Academy at Canton produced the first really effecti body of officers trained on modern lines that China had seen, h paid particular attention to the building up of an efficient office corps: those of "the Generalissimo's Own" bear no inapt cor parison with Cromwell's Puritans; they have an Officers' Clu admission to which is a high honour only to be gained by Sparta self-denial in the normal pleasures of mankind, drinking, smokir and so forth. In the early years of the war many defeats we suffered because of the Chinese inability to co-ordinate their mov ments properly: for time counts for little in Asia, especially in country with 4,000 years of continuous history. How great th improvement in this respect has been was shown at the battle c Changsha last October, when the Japanese were allowed to advanc right up to the city, with lines of communication nearly 200 mile long, before the Chinese fell upon them from all sides. It was a action which called for the greatest nerve and good timing, and came off perfectly. All Chinese forces now are provided with fiel

dio sets with which to communicate with each other and with
ungking.

Many arsenals, well scattered and camouflaged in West China,
oduce a sufficiency of light arms and ammunition, the raw
aterial for which is all under the Government's control. Accord-
g to a recent report the Chinese are now producing synthetic
trol already in quantities enough for 1,500 vehicles a month. For
e greater part of their transport they fall back on human muscles,
exhaustible in numbers and more experienced in carrying heavy
eights over long distances than any in the world; on the sturdy
tle ponies of West China; on mules, yaks and camels. The
hinese guerrillas take a steady toll of Japanese life, which has
en conservatively estimated at as many as forty casualties a day.
he successful raids on Nanking, Shanghai, Amoy, Canton and else-
here early last month are a good example of what can be done.
hese troops consist mainly of men deliberately left behind by the
hinese Government in 1938 when it retreated to the West, to
rry the Japanese rear. It is not generally recognized that nearly
ree-fifths of the territory overrun by the Japanese remains wholly
der the control of the Chinese Government, which sends to the
errillas money and arms. They also capture a good deal of
uipment by raiding Japanese outposts and convoys.

That China suffers a heavy blow by the temporary loss of land
mmunications with her Allies is self-evident. The road from
anipur, the terminus of the Bengal-Assam railway, through
hamo to a point on the Burma road 105 miles from Lashio which
as expected to be a useful adjunct, is closed by the Japanese
lvance to the Chinese frontier. There are some tracks from
ssam through Myitkyina in northern Burma into Yunnan, but
ese cannot be of any great value. The north-western road into
ussian territory remains undisturbed, but Russia cannot spare
uch for China now. The new road from West China along the
ibetan border through Assam into India—its exact direction is a
cret; but by General Chiang's forethought it was begun directly
e Japanese occupied northern Indo-China in August, 1940—
ould be ready for use by the end of this year. Till then China
n only get from her Allies what can be sent by air.

There is, however, no fear that China will give in. She has not
ood up single-handed to all the might of Japan for four-and-a-half
ears, and proved again and again, though with still very slender
lp from outside, that she can defeat the enemy, in order to lose
ith now in the ultimate recovery of her freedom and the satis-
ction of her national ambitions. She has suffered terrible losses,
l her seaboard and her best cities and millions of her sons, and she

has come through undaunted. The loss of Burma, little as it wa expected, is only one more test of China's inexhaustible patienc which she will endure as she has endured countless tragedies in he long history. She cannot conquer the Japanese and drive then into the sea until she receives heavy artillery and aeroplanes fron her Allies; those she must and no doubt eventually will have. Bu she can with her own resources continue to pin down a millio Japanese and wage a steady war of attrition upon them.

So much for the military aspect of the Burma tragedy so far a China is concerned. But there is a political side which ought no to be overlooked. It is, of course, unthinkable that General Chian Kai-shek would go back on his joint pledge with all the Allies t make no separate peace, and all the best minds of the nation ar with him, like the millions of humble Chinese for whom "what th Generalissimo says" is the last word. Less than a month ag (on May 5) a National General Mobilization Act came into forc which gives the Government practically unlimited control of al China's man-power, war material, prices and capital. That i symptomatic of Chinese morale and will-to-win. But it would b wrong to ignore the not very pleasant tone of some of the Chines papers in recent weeks, or the uneasy thoughts undoubtedly presen even in the minds of Chinese well placed to take a comprehensiv view of the whole world. The suspicion that Great Britain an America regard the Far East as a side show, deepened by som rather injudicious remarks last January by Colonel Knox, th United States Secretary for the Navy, has not been diminished b subsequent events. There is an undeniable feeling that China' position in the war has never been fairly appreciated, the mor acute because the Chinese have always justly maintained that i fighting Japan they were fighting for the West as much as fo themselves. Recently, too, the Chinese have begun to ask question as to what will be their own situation *vis-à-vis* of the Allies afte the war. It would hardly be surprising if they remembered how badly they were let down at the Paris Conference when it wa revealed that their Allies had secretly agreed to the Japanes retaining the former German possessions in Shantung; and afte this war very much more will be at stake than after the last.

Thus, writing in the *New York Times Magazine* of April, Madam Chiang Kai-shek said:—

> Both the East and West have foolishly tried to be self-sufficient Neither has succeeded nor could succeed. Each must acknowledge tha the other has something to teach.
>
> We hope the West has now learned the value to them of China's spiritua strength which sustained us in our darkest moment. We in China mus

learn the value to us of scientific developments of the West.

In the world society that we are going to create there must be no thought of superiors and inferiors. We must be equal men and women of all races pressing forward to a great ideal.

This article attracted great attention in Chungking where it reflected and stimulated the thoughts of many people. According to the *Manchester Guardian's* well-informed correspondent, Mr. Gunther Stein, these feelings can be crystallized into two desires as follows:—

1. That Britain should more quickly learn lessons from the past, emulating elsewhere the spirit and performance shown in the British Isles.
2. The Allies should draw up a special Pacific charter guaranteeing to all the peoples of the Far East the fullest equality after the war, thoroughly changing the pre-war status in every respect.

Now this surely is a matter of supreme importance and if we can satisfy Chinese thought as regards our intentions for the future we shall have done much to wipe out their misgiving that we have treated the Far East as a side-show, which in any case future events will no doubt disprove as the Allies rise to their full strength. But the Chinese are keenly conscious of what they are fighting for—freedom, independence, recovery of national rights and grandeur—and they need to be assured in no unmistakable way that the Allies are fighting for these too.

It is regrettable that Chinese papers seem to have forgotten that Great Britain's set policy for over fifteen years has been, not only the complete abandonment of the old so-called "gunboat policy," but the return to China of all the special privileges and concessions acquired in the 19th century; furthermore a golden opportunity was lost not long ago in London of underlining and reiterating the fact.

In May, 1941, in a letter to Dr. Quo Tai-chi, then on his way from London through the United States to take up the post of Foreign Minister in Chungking, Mr. Cordell Hull said:—

> It goes without saying that the Government of the United States, in continuation of the steps already taken towards meeting China's aspirations in its international relations, expects, when conditions of peace again prevail, to move rapidly by the processes of orderly negotiation and agreement with the Chinese Government towards the relinquishment of the last of certain rights of a special character which this country, together with other countries, has long possessed in China by virtue of the agreements providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction and related practices.

Shortly afterwards Mr. Eden made a similar statement in the House of Commons. But there was nothing in the report of what he said to show to the uninstructed and forgetful world that we were doing more than follow in America's footsteps.

The facts are very different. For in a lengthy memorandum in December, 1926, which he reiterated a month later in a speech at Birmingham, the late Sir Austen Chamberlain solemnly proclaimed Great Britain's intention to surrender all her special rights and concessions in China. In fulfilment of this pledge the British Concessions at Hankow, Kiukiang and Chinkiang were given back to China* and in the summer of 1931 an agreement for the abolition of British extraterritoriality had actually been initialled by Sir Miles Lampson and Dr. C. T. Wang, then Chinese Foreign Minister, when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria postponed its fulfilment. There is not the slightest doubt but that, if the Japanese had not further invaded China in 1937, Sir Austen Chamberlain's declaration would by now have been carried through to the last clause.

There is a strong case for the issue now by Great Britain of a further declaration, recalling in detail what she has actually done to meet China's aspirations and reiterating the Chamberlain policy. An expression of admiration for the gallant behaviour of the Chinese troops in Burma would furnish a suitable peg on which to hang the declaration, which would go far to assuage their feelings as regards the past and reassure them as to the future; and they certainly deserve it.

Such a statement is the more desirable since there are probably some in this country, not perhaps many but influential, who will want to bargain the cancellation of British extraterritoriality against special consideration for our financial interests in China. Those interests are unquestionably very great—landed property, factories, banks, shipping, insurance, a total that has been estimated as high as £300,000,000. But obviously there can be no huckstering with such an Ally as China, who will yet be, in all probability, a major factor in bringing down Japan; and the sooner we make it clear that there is no such thought in our minds the better. If we approach China on a basis of frank equality, leaving the dead past to bury its past, looking only to the future in a spirit of co-operation and mutual trust, there need be no fear for the welfare of our interests at her hands.

*The Territory of Weihaiwei was restored to China in fulfilment of Lord Balfour's pledge at the Washington Conference in 1922, showing that Great Britain's decisions regarding China had been framed four years before Sir Austen Chamberlain put them in detailed form.

EQUALITY OR EQUITY?

By The Bishop of Truro

THE word "equal" belongs to mathematics and has a strict meaning; but it is used in various social and political connections with a dangerous looseness. In the agreed statement published in *The Times* of Saturday, December 21, 1940, signed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council, five principles are enumerated of which the second is:

> Every child, regardless of race or class, should have equal opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities.

In Clause 4 of the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration on the policies of the United Kingdom and of the United States, broadcast on August 14, 1941, the word "equal" occurs again:

> They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

These two examples must suffice. In both cases the word "equal" does not mean strictly or mathematically *equal*. Nor, of course, in the famous French trio—"Liberty, Fraternity, Equality"—did *Equality* mean that either. There it simply meant "equality before the Law," an equal right to justice.

In 1941 a number of drastic reforms in the organization and arrangements of the Church of England were suggested for the consideration of Church people in a little book entitled *Putting our House in Order*, and the foreword was signed by over a hundred of the leading bishops, clergy and laity. Here the writers recognize the ambiguity of the word "equality" in such a context and they express themselves as agreeing that there should be "a reasonable equality of stipends" among the clergy. But it will be observed that accuracy would require "reasonable inequality" rather than "reasonable equality." Indeed it may be said that in most instances where the word "equality" is used what is in mind is a contrast with some piece of unreasonable inequality, and the contrast really intended is that between reasonable and unreasonable inequality.

Now it may be argued that all this is obvious and the people who use the word "equal" in responsible pronouncements are well aware that they are not using the word in its strict mathematical sense. But unfortunately they are liable to be taken in the stricter sense by at least two classes of persons.

The first are the over-conscientious: such persons, for example, as those who urge statesmen to formulate their war-aims or their peace-terms, and afterwards hold them to a literal exactness which may have quite unforeseen and even disastrous consequences. With such critics waiting to pounce, statesmen may well feel unwilling to commit themselves to anything but general principles or to details which are certain and crystal-clear. The word "equal" is one of the words they should avoid. The second class of persons who are liable to take the word mathematically when it was not meant to be so taken are those whom Dr. Johnson used to call "weak heads." These persons, who are very numerous, are always pleased to be told that they are equal to others who hold positions of greater responsibility or influence than themselves. "Nor is any man," said Dr. Johnson, "more an enemy to public peace, than he who fills weak heads with imaginary claims."

Social reconstruction of a thorough-going kind is long overdue, and even the more conservative may welcome a determined offensive against the anti-social elements in our present system. But let us give the real enemy his true name. The real enemy is not inequality: the real enemy is injustice. What we must strive for is not equality but equity. Aristotle says (*Politics*, III, 9):

> All men cling to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge erroneously.

The most interesting modern discussion of "equality" is that by Dr. R. H. Tawney in the Halley Stewart Lecture for 1929. In his opening chapter Dr. Tawney quotes an observation of Matthew Arnold to the effect that in England inequality is almost a religion. Dr. Tawney admits that much has changed since Matthew Arnold's time, but he himself seems to have swung so far in the other direction as to make equality almost a religion. But that will not do either. Preachers of a Gospel of Equality often refer to Wordsworth,

and particularly to the ninth book of his autobiographical poem, the Prelude. But while Wordsworth wrote movingly of "man and his noble nature" (355), he never maintained that men are equal. Indeed his misgivings with regard to a monarchical system of government were largely due to his "beholding that the best ruled not, and feeling that they ought to rule" (213, 214). Other apostles of equality are fond of quoting a saying of Mr. Hilaire Belloc's: "What is common to all men is not *more* important but *infinitely more* important than the accidents by which men differ." But those elements "common to all men" are present in various individuals in various degrees, and men differ by more than "accidents". Nor, even if two persons are equal in things of the spirit, does it follow that they are, or should be, equal in everything. Nature has certainly not made men equal in mental and bodily powers, and certain inequalities of privilege follow naturally from inequalities of mind and body.

Let us take an illustration which is in itself rather naïve but which does bring out a real important factor in the whole complex situation of to-day. Here are two gardeners, A and B. Their gardens are exactly similar, but A is a far better gardener than B, and his garden produces a great deal more. It is only right that he should reap some extra benefit. Indeed he naturally will, unless the extra is wrested from him. This extra benefit will probably be translated into terms of money. But money is only a means of exchange adopted in civilized countries whereby advantages of various kinds may be obtained in return for others. Out of the products of his labour A will purchase various advantages for his family as well as for himself. A *and his family* will be better off than B *and his family*; and it is equitable that he should be. We have equity though not equality: and it is equity and not equality that we want. Continue this differentiating process into the next generation. A^1 and his family will be still better off than B^1 and his family: the difference will have grown wider: and so into the third and succeeding generations. No doubt, in the ordinary course of nature, such a process seldom gets very far. Before long a generation of family B will prove themselves superior to the corresponding generation of family A, and the difference of privilege will be reduced. Moreover all along outstanding individuals will appear as exceptions to the general trend at the moment. Superiority of the kind we have here in mind should be acknow-

ledged. The better stock must not be put in irons to force it to the level of the inferior.

Progress depends, Dr. Tawney himself admits (page 86) "on a willingness on the part of the mass of mankind—and we all, in nine-tenths of our nature, belong to the mass—to recognize genuine superiority, and to submit themselves to its influence." "Subordination," said Dr. Johnson, in 1763, "tends greatly to human happiness." Strict equality could only be obtained, and could only be preserved, by repressive force, and the employment of such repressive force would be as disastrous as it would be unjust.

The question, of course, arises, under a freely working equitable system what extra advantages may the community rightly and wisely allow to be purchasable by the members of the more gifted or industrious, that is to say the higher-earning, family? Fresh air and pure water must be free to all; the roads must be for all to walk on, and so on. The answer to our question will depend on the assets available in the community at any given period. The crucial point is education. A's family will be able to enjoy various little amenities which should make it easier for his children to learn to equip themselves. But are they to go to exactly the same schools and universities as B's children? At any given moment some schools are better than others, some universities are better than others. Most students, if given a choice, would probably prefer Oxford or Cambridge to one of the more modern provincial universities. But room at Oxford and Cambridge is limited. How are the nine or ten thousand students for these universities to be selected out of the many thousands who are to have a university course? Competitive examinations—it is to be hoped of a revised kind—may be employed in the selection of students. But examinations are not always very reliable tests; and to fill Oxford and Cambridge automatically with the nine thousand students who came at the head of the examination lists would be a bad thing for the other universities and not good for Oxford and Cambridge themselves. Perhaps the greater number of the vacancies at these two universities should be filled in that way; but some should be left for students from families like A's who, while not among the first nine thousand academically, have attained a sufficiently good standard to benefit greatly from a university course, and can bring with them a little from their family's earnings. That such a prospect should attend superiority of the kind we are

considering is both equitable and also in the ultimate interests of the community at large. To the ordinary man the best part of his reward for application and labour is that which can be applied for the benefit of his children. Parental aspiration should receive appropriate—not, of course, excessive—encouragement.

If it be argued that under present conditions privileges commonly go to persons and the children of persons who do not deserve them, for the kind of superiority they possess is not serviceable to the community as a whole, that argument is rather beside the present point. Conditions must be improved until the kind of superiority rewarded is the kind that is of benefit to the whole community. This, of course, is an immense, as well as an urgent, task; and we shall undertake it all the more effectively if we do not allow ourselves to be confused by a misleading theory of equality.

Moreover two subsidiary considerations must not be overlooked. The first is that a society arranged rigidly in horizontal layers according to merit of the kind that is tested by examinations would be taut and steel-hard. The constant examinations involved would be an intolerable strain, and would perpetuate the incessant competition which is an already acknowledged evil. The presence of a certain number of worthy candidates at levels rather above those corresponding to their own personal abilities has a valuable cushion effect. The second consideration which must be taken into account has already been touched upon: selection by any examination hitherto devised does not always produce satisfactory results, least of all when the candidates are at an early age; and candidates who have shown good, but not outstanding abilities, and come of a stock which has already given some indication of its worth, often in the long run amply justify their selection.

Unfortunately there is a great deal of obvious humbug connected with the advocacy of equality. In his *Augustus* (page 330) John Buchan remarks:

> He (Augustus) was free from equalitarian whimsies, a malady from which the ancient world did not greatly suffer; he did not believe in that degeneration of democratic theory which imagines that there is a peculiar inspiration in the opinions of the ignorant and a singular nobility in the character of the penniless.

The dock-worker can easily be roused to indignation at the inequality between himself and his employer. The inequality in wages between him and the seaman who

braves all the perils of the voyage at sea does not worry him nearly as much. Most people are inclined to be somewhat tolerant of inequalities in their own favour. One of the strongest of human passions, alas, is jealousy; and very often the driving power behind the agitation for equality is three-parts jealousy. Society should not pander to so discreditable a motive. Is England to-day really class-ridden? Is America really happier? Or Russia? Not yet, at any rate. The principle *Noblesse oblige* is not much in evidence to-day, but the last time I heard the motto quoted it was quoted by a Labour Member of Parliament, a sound and generous Scot. If that principle is allowed to fall into oblivion, it will be a grievous loss.

Some years ago I happened to be in a French village when some very high Government official paid it a visit. I was surprised at the little respect shown to him. Lack of respect is widely characteristic of modern society, and is an unhealthy symptom. It is partly accounted for by the history of inequality which, as outlined by Dr. Tawney, rouses indignation. In many instances there should still be a reduction of existing inequalities, and the common aim should be that if some may have more than others, all should have enough. He says (page 118):

> Individual happiness does not only require that men should be free to rise to new positions of comfort and distinction; it also requires that they should be able to lead a life of dignity and culture, whether they rise or not, and that, whatever their position on the economic scale may be, it shall be such as is fit to be occupied by men.

To this end should be enlisted the practical co-operation of all men of good-will, but none of them should be required to subscribe to a sweeping and inexact equalitarian formula. A further question suggests itself at this point: if there is a lower limit below which no one must be allowed to fall, must there not be an upper limit of inequality above which no one must be allowed to rise? Clearly there must; but a discussion of the point lies outside the limits of this present article.

Men are not equal. But the Christian Religion recognizes them as brethren. Too many people have a very soft and sentimental notion of Christianity. True Christianity is critical: it proves all things, and holds fast only to that which is good. My Christianity does not require me to accept the statement that when A and B bring a child C into the world, C has a right to a contribution from me for his maintenance.

I recognize no such *right*. A and B cannot *demand* a contribution from me towards the maintenance of their child. But as a Christian I sincerely want to be of assistance to them all, and contribute I certainly will if the need is genuine, and I am in a position to help. There is scope in human life for charity as well as for justice. The word charity has been woefully misused. But it is a good word, standing for a great thing—"Friendship to all the world," as Bishop Jeremy Taylor defined it. My Christianity does not prevent my feeling that this continual harping on the word equality is mischievous. Nevertheless I am willing to pay heavy taxes in order to improve the educational opportunities and the general well-being of the workers and their families who are worse off than I am.

Mr. Michael Roberts in his masterly book *The Recovery of the West* refers to the optimistic view of human nature commonly taken by the socialist. He writes:

> His faith in progress and in the innate goodness of man is such that he thinks that rising prosperity is normal and inevitable and that there is no need to protect the qualities of application, enterprise and co-operation on which all progress depends.

But Mr. Roberts goes on to say that "in practice, this optimistic view of human nature has not been justified." Quite so. The Christian religion from the first has always recognized that human nature left to itself is not good enough, and one of the essential elements in Christian worship is aspiration; the lifting up of our desire towards the Ideal, towards the Perfect Good. The Christian Church is a worshipping fellowship, a fellowship not of the equal but of the aspiring. It aims at being a universal fellowship, and in such a fellowship, shibboleths have no place. The individual is not required to subscribe to any such theory or creed as that of equality, but to use his talents to the fullest extent in united sustained effort to achieve practical improvements in human affairs. Programmes and prospectuses are better without blessed words of ambiguous significance. I agree with the eminent ecclesiastics, but I would leave out their word "equal." The clause is honester without it: "Every child, regardless of race or class, should have opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities." I agree, similarly, with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, but I would substitute "equitable" for "equal" in the only place in which they use the word and read: "access on equitable terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world."

MORALE AND SHORT TERM EDUCATION

By Stephen Spender

THERE is a growing sense to-day that the war effort is not as great as it might be. This is to some extent due to glaring examples of bad organization, which can be remedied. But there is a deeper uneasiness caused by the lack of co-operation amongst different classes. This disunity is due to more than defective organization.

The sense that the war effort is not 100 per cent. is usually conveyed by such words as "complacency," "Blimpishness," "slackness" and "apathy." These words correspond to forms which suspicion assumes between two classes of society. "Complacency" and "Blimpishness" are used to describe upper class defects: "slackness" and "apathy," those of the workers. So that the very use of these words, which are used of different classes of society, denotes the presence of something other than the surface faults they connote. Beneath "Blimpishness" on the one hand, and "apathy" on the other, are mutual suspicion, lack of unity, lack of co-operation, and an atmosphere of recriminations.

To anyone, like myself, who has lived for several months in working class conditions, with workers, it is quite clear that our home propaganda is unsuccessful amongst most of them. It will never be a success unless propagandists tackle first and foremost the problem of class disunity. One does not have to look far to find examples of failure. This country has now been at war for nearly three years, against an enemy who has behaved with appalling brutality. Moreover, he has greatly lowered the standard of living of the countries over which he has been victorious. Yet it is doubtful whether the government has ever really succeeded in convincing the ordinary people here that they are very much better off than they would be under Nazi rule. They show a curious unwillingness to believe this and turn a deaf ear to the stories of atrocities committed in Poland and elsewhere.

Yet although the workers show little interest in the Nazi treatment of the Occupied Countries, and even with how the Nazis would treat them themselves should Germany win the war, yet they show the utmost enthusiasm for Russia's struggle against Germany, and would regard it as an unqualified catastrophe should the Germans defeat the Russians. The many people who cynically say that conditions will be much the same for the workers should the Nazis conquer England, would never say the same of a possible Nazi conquest of Russia.

There are two points of view here which may seem incompatible—that the
azis have committed atrocities in Russia, but that German atrocities in
oland and Czechoslovakia are just atrocity stories of the kind that were put
out, and which we learned to disbelieve, in the last war. Yet, really, there
a remarkable consistency concealed within this apparent incompatibility.
you believe in something positive, the destruction of that thing is in itself
, atrocious catastrophe, so that all the minor atrocity incidents follow from
e greater tragedy necessarily. If you do not believe in the positive good
the society within which you live, then its destruction is not a tragedy, and
ty number of atrocities and disasters which may take place in the course of
e murder of the society itself, only seem so many isolated examples, which
ven if they can be proved to be true, demonstrate nothing. As a matter of
ct, it is remarkably difficult to prove to people who know nothing of Poland
iat atrocities have taken place there, if they maintain an attitude of
epticism. So what Sir Stafford Cripps called the 'disinterestedness' of
eople over here about the war, in comparison with the interestedness of the
ussians, is really the lack of a belief in the positive principle of our own
emocracy: from this follows the lack of concern with the evils of fascism.
It is possible for intelligent people to have faith in the 'lesser evil': indeed,
ne might label our cause, as it is presented to us, with all the emphasis on
that wicked man Hitler,' rather than on those good men who form our own
overnmental class, the 'lesser evil.' This idea particularly appeals to
eople who benefit from the existing system: morally, they may not have
nuch faith, but, none the less, they survive quite comfortably, they are able
o uphold a certain standard of culture and they enjoy individual freedom.
'his, which is the argument of our propaganda, is an argument which appeals
o the intellectuals, and to those who are comfortably situated, such as officials
n the Ministry of Information and the B.B.C. It is not an argument which
as much appeal to the workers, who are scarcely aware of the existence of
ulture, and who have little security.

To people who enjoy economic independence, who are able to rise above
imiting circumstances to the expression of their individuality, freedom of
elf-expression is the greatest value in democracy. Even when they feel
hat there must be something wrong with the whole structure of this society,
hey still care for it because they have enjoyed this freedom and they can
nvisage the horror of losing it. What they really value is the opportunity
o become themselves. But to people whose nominal freedom is outweighed
y their actual misery and insecurity, freedom of individual expression may
eem a cut flower, cut off from its roots in the well-being of the whole society.
As insecurity increases, these masses of people become more and more
uspicious of the value of freedom of self-expression.

It is possible to preserve freedom, but not if it is felt by the majority to be
or the few at the expense of the many. What is it the people want, which is

growing to appear to them even more important than the freedom of intelligentzia? So much so indeed, that there is a danger of individual fr dom of self-expression being regarded as a superstition waiting to be sup seded? I think the undoubted answer to this question is that the people coming to value the unity of the whole of society more than they do individ freedom. For this reason they admire Soviet Russia, because they beli that the Russians are a united people, working together for common en which will benefit all.

When a patient fails to remember his real dream, and invents the parts has forgotten, psycho-analysts tell us that the new substitutions may be revealing of his character as the original dream. In the same way, one sho study the idea which people have of Soviet Russia, without dismissing because it may not resemble the reality. I think that the popular myth Soviet Russia in the minds of English people to-day has several very striki features. In the first place, people are not so deluded as to imagine that t majority of Russians are better off than we are (this in itself should g pause to our propagandists who assume the value of pointing out that t worker is worse off under Hitler). Secondly, the people show a curio indifference to questions of the amount of liberty enjoyed by individuals Soviet Russia. These questions, if they arise, have an academic rather th a pressing interest. Thirdly, the people are quite conscious of the fact th they imagine more than they know about Russia. However, they belie the Russians imagine that they have a government which represents t interests of the whole people, and not only vested interests. They do n pretend to be certain that the ordinary Russian is justified in his faith Stalin. But the point is that he has such a faith. As I heard some people a Cornish pub say when Russia came into the war: "The Russians may being kidded, but at least they believe that they've got something wor fighting for. We may have something worth fighting for in reality, but w haven't any faith."

Therefore, the idea of Russia in the minds of the people who are not cor munists, but who are most enthusiastic about the struggle of the Soviet Unio to-day, is a more or less conscious myth of what they would like our socie to be. The essential point is that we should have faith in ourselves. Fe people would say that we want to imitate the Soviet system; though mar would say we want "something on the Russian lines." This is because the feel the necessity of faith; and they regard as the indispensable condition faith—unity. Unity, I think, and not freedom. Therefore, if those of u who care for freedom want it to survive, we must make sure that it is roote in unity. Otherwise it will be swept away as one of the hypocritical pretence of a society which is lacking in economic democracy.

In a recent number of *Britain To-day*, a propagandist magazine issued b the British Library of Information, and sold in America, the editor says tha

is easy to preserve good morale in times of victory and success, but that e testing time comes when we have reverses. This statement does not ally meet the problem of morale in Britain at all; in fact, the truth is almost e opposite. It is unfortunate that our propagandists so often work on an tire misunderstanding of the situation, which our enemies understand very ell. The fact is, as Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain showed, that when e are directly attacked and have reverses, there is no problem of morale at . Our danger periods are lulls, and minor successes. Also our imperial verses represent a danger to morale, but not of the kind that the editor of *itain To-day* fears. The trouble about the loss of Malay, Singapore, etc., not that they are regarded as serious reverses (if they were taken as this ey would unite the people at home), but that they emphasize class disunity home, because they are regarded by the workers as judgments on the competence and injustices of our rule in the empire, for which the workers emselves feel in no way responsible. Our most serious danger (from the oint of view of morale) would be if the Axis left this island completely alone r, say, two years, and attacked the empire piecemeal all round the globe.

At the back of the minds of some other officials, there is an idea, I think, iat morale does not matter. Their argument is that, if attacked, we do not ave to worry about morale; and if not attacked, we can 'muddle through' ith a great deal of grumbling, as we have done before. This argument fails o take account of the peculiar nature of this war, which is a total one. That to say, it is a war that demands above all unity. Hitler's whole success has een built on the thesis, 'divide and conquer.' You cannot divide England by ttacking, but you can, perhaps, by leaving her alone; and if left alone long nough, she will lose her strategic advantages. So that a negative kind of nity which functions when we are attacked is not sufficient to win the war; till less, to win the peace. Any thoughtful person looking at the situation o-day must be nervous of the possibility of such unity as we have collapsing fter the war, unless there is a great change of attitude in the next few ears. And, in order to win the war, it is becoming more apparent that we eed offensive unity, as well as our wonderful power of co-operating when e have our backs against the wall.

How is a unity to be achieved which will carry us both through the war and he peace? The basis of such a unity is to pull down the class barrier. At resent, the chief cause of apathy is due to the failure of the workers to nvisage any sort of future in which they will play a part. The soldiers see he end of the war as waiting to be demobilized; unemployment; or, at best, return to the pre-war job, under worse conditions. They cannot believe that ve will ever return to 1939; yet they feel, that if things are altered, they will e for the worse, "unless someone makes a revolution." It does not usually ccur to them that they themselves might take any part, even in revolution.

The workers do not require promises and bribes, which in themselves imply

that there is a class of 'haves' in a position to offer something in th possession to a class of 'have-nots.' It would even be a mistake to talk more wireless sets, motor cars, etc., for all. These things are made to l for, not to fight and die for. People will only fight for faith, and the fa required is simply this: that the government truly represents the intere of all both in the war and the post-war period. There should be a declarat not of promises, but of common aims of social improvement: aims, beca they depend not on the leadership of the nation alone, but on the co-operat of the whole nation with that leadership. As long as we are sure of th common aims which will benefit the whole community, sacrifices will be m willingly. The most unifying appeal of the war was Churchill's offer 'blood, sweat, toil and tears.' The communist party (then anti-war) m a grave psychological mistake in deriding this.

The basis of morale at home is to transform the frustrated energy wast in class conflict into the united energy of a society co-operating to achie aims which will benefit all. There is also the question of the attitude of o own people to our Empire. At present this is one of apathy, refusal responsibility, and a complete unawareness of the consequences that colon losses will have on the standard of life of ordinary men and women. T working class are apathetic about home affairs because they feel that th are oppressed and exploited; they are apathetic about the Empire and th want to thrust the responsibility for oppression and exploitation on to t ruling class. They would change their attitude if they felt that just as t government stands for them it also stands for the well-being of ordinary m and women like themselves in the Empire. In other words, we are o entitled to hold on to our Empire if we perform a service to humanity ther in protecting our possessions from being taken by the fascist countries, a in developing these territories in the interests of the people living there.

We must remove the class division from politics, and remove it from o propaganda. Our propaganda, like everything else, suffers to-day fr being run on a class basis. A class of people who are educated and in position to obtain knowledge which is inaccessible to the ordinary peo lectures—through the wireless, the press and the Ministry of Information another class of people, living completely different lives and in no positi to judge the truth of what they are told. Most of the speakers on the wir less, or sent round to factories by the Ministry of Information, most of t writers in the newspapers, are talking across a gulf which divides the enormously different circumstances from those of the audience whom th are addressing. Essentially the audience is talked down to. Propaganda not a means of exchanging ideas and co-operating mentally but is a disguis form of giving orders and imposing an official attitude of mind.

The public happens to be particularly ill-adapted to receive these ment orders at present, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, for years befo

e war—its capacity to think realistically about fundamentally the same uation as the one in which we are now living was derided and mocked by e papers who published statements that there would be no war, by politicians till in power to-day) who denied the figures of German re-armament, by a neral attitude of mind encouraging escapism of every kind. In the second ace, the public has reasons to distrust the wisdom of the publicists who so nsistently make statements about the war which are soon shown up as ving no real grasp of what is happening. So that in addition to class feel-g, there is also profound distrust of everything that the newspapers, the reless and the Ministry of Information say.

Our propaganda, instead of being exhortation by a class of directives to a ass of people who are directed, should consist much more of a co-operative fort by all to understand the tasks of the war, the aims of democracy, how ese can be achieved in the war and in the peace, and how the total effort of ciety is related to the particular effort of the individual in the factory, the my, the Civil Defence unit. Propaganda must mean the education of the hole people in the tasks that lie ahead of them. This propaganda should be sed on two realities; the common aims of the whole society, and the fact at a generation of men and women now adult has in a comparatively short ne—say five years—got to transform the world as we know it; moreover, great many individuals must now equip themselves mentally to seize the portunities and fulfil the tasks of that new society.

As far as possible, this education, which one might label Short Term ducation, should be led by people who lead the same kind of lives as those hom they are instructing. The A.R.P. worker, or the factory hand, is far ore likely to listen to someone who is dressed in A.R.P. uniform or in ungarees, than to someone who comes out of a Ministry. If Firemen, for xample, are talked to by a fellow Fireman, it immediately occurs to them hat they might know what their teacher knows, that both are faced by the me problems and both are making an effort to win the war on the same rms and for the same reasons. The immediate tasks of Short Term ducation should be to make everyone aware that the war is in the interest f the whole community and that it requires the utmost effort of every ember of the community. Everyone should as far as possible have some hole picture of the war in his mind so as to see how he himself fits into it. he worker in a particular job should be instructed by the worker in touch ith a rather wider world, outside the factory; at the same time this struction should have something in it of a mutual exchange of values, ecause the man close to his job certainly has something to give to the man ith a vision of the whole society outside the particular job.

What democracy needs is a mass education movement springing from elow, and not imposed from outside and above, though certainly use should e made of available educationalists 'to educate the educators.' But there

should not be a rootless, artificial class of people, connected with nothing propaganda, going out to lecture people who are connected with the rea conditions of their own work. The workers should have their own educato appointed in every factory, corresponding to Army Education Officers. T existing academic institutions should be used to train these instructors their work.

There are good reasons for thinking that the time is ripe for such a develo ment. In the Fire Service a scheme of Discussion Groups has be started, which has had an altogether surprising success. It started as scheme for harmless entertainment, but it has turned more and more into education scheme, on account of the insistent demands of the men in t Fire Service, who say, in one form or another at almost every meeting: "W cannot work Democracy, because we are not educated."

In Russia, propaganda has for long been treated as education of the indiv ual in the needs of the whole society. The Political Commissar gives the m at his post a picture of the whole life of the society in which he lives, and its furthest aims. The individual has a living connection with the life ou side himself, and the educator is the means of putting him in contact with wider source of energy, which at the same time demands the contribution his own effort. If we did not believe that the generalized life of the wh society had energy to give, and a contribution of work to take, from t individual, and that in order that this may be achieved, there must be an acti and conscious relationship between the two, we would not talk about mora for that energizing relationship is, precisely morale. In this country, w have lived too long on mechanical effort—a mere accumulation of millions grudging morsels of work into a grey and colourless total which someh muddles us through. Although the machine continues to work, life is colou less and without the illumination of a faith that our society is performi active good. There is much that is good in it, but the majority of peop require that they should see the connection between their own lives and ev such things as the achievement of science, the running of factories and t writing of books. When they do see such a connection an amazing energ and happiness is released; then miracles can be performed. The majority people in England think that Russia is performing just such a miracle, which they themselves, in their hearts believe themselves capable, if son barrier which renders everything mechanical and meaningless were lifted fro their lives. 'The people of England have never spoken yet.' When the have been taught to speak, they will astonish the world with their vitalit their intelligence, and the richness of their capacity for enjoying life. I a convinced too that their true development is towards freedom and tolerance the two qualities, which in their strength and truth, and not in their isolatio and ineffectiveness, the world to-day most needs.

THE SITUATION IN INDIA

A letter to an Englishman

ar T——,

I was glad to have your note asking me to explain why India wouldn't take e Cripps offer. Other friends have put the same question and several ganizations want me to come and tell them the pros and cons of the Indian siness. At last India is news in this country, the press having seen the ssibilities for sensation and the public having been awakened from its athy by the Japanese walk-over through the Malayan archipelago, across ırma, to the very eastern doors of India! But never mind how this interest as provoked. I welcome the fact that it has been aroused at all. For India facing, literally, one of the greatest crises in its long history; and, as you ill realize, England bears the main responsibility for the fact that my ountry finds itself in such a precarious state of moral and material unpre- ıredness before this crisis . . .

As a matter of fact, on the surface at least, Sir Stafford Cripps's mission to ıdia, too, seems to have been conceived in a belated recognition of this onsideration. 'Why, then, did India reject his offer?' you ask. Before answer that question it is very necessary for me to tell you exactly how ıe mission was brought about and what were the terms of its offer. Various ro-government publicists have told this story in their own self-righteous anner. So a nationalist view of the history of the past two years of Indo- ritish relationship is important for an understanding of the present *débâcle.*

Perhaps you know that immediately after the late Mr. Chamberlain's eclaration of war in September, 1939, the Viceroy proclaimed India to be a elligerent country. The new 1935 India constitution was annulled forth- vith and rule by ordinance and decree of the Viceroy began in India. The overnments formed by the Indian National Congress party in the nine rovinces of British India, where the Congress had won overwhelming ıajorities on an 85 per cent. poll in the 1937 elections, resigned from office. ınd the emergency measures of the Defence of India Act came into force.

While sympathizing wholeheartedly with Britain in its struggle against Iitlerism and aggression, the Indian National Congress asked what were the 3ritish Government's war and peace aims. The Congress is one of the iggest political parties in the world, certainly the biggest in India and based ıot on religious, sectional, caste or class basis but on a united stand of the eoples of India for national freedom. It asked if, as the British Government

declared, the war was really being fought for freedom and democracy, h
these twin ideals were going to be applied to India and the colonies. It ad
that India would be more than willing to do her bit in the war for freed
and peace in the world,but was not interested in the war if these princip
did not apply to her. And it demanded the immediate recognition of Indi
right to freedom and an agreement by the Government that India's futu
would be determined by a democratically elected constituent Assembly.

The British Government replied in a very offhand manner and Lo
Linlithgow repeated the age-old promise of Dominion Status for India so
time in the nebulous future. Meanwhile, he offered to form a consultati
committee of Indians who would help to propagandize the war effort.

At Poona, on July 7, the Congress made a last offer to meet the Briti
Government, reiterating the national demands and asking Britain to crea
a provisional national government which would be able to command t
confidence of the central legislature and to get the co-operation of the oth
legislatures.

The Secretary of State for India turned down these proposals and dismiss
the idea of a national government out of hand as completely unacceptab
On August 8, 1940, the Viceroy again repeated the old formula that t
enjoyment of Dominion Status was India's appointed destiny, and he invit
representative Indians to serve on his executive council, proposing also a w
advisory council which was to meet every two months. The representativ
on both these would have had no power except to make submissions. Ther
fore the Congress rejected this declaration.

The last exchanges between the Viceroy and Mr. Gandhi brought no rela
ation of the authoritarian grip at the centre and Mr. Gandhi launched h
campaign of civil disobedience by asking individual Congressmen to off
themselves for symbolic arrest. Most of the Congress leaders thus went
prison. Apart from them, hundreds of peasant and trade union leaders h
already been interned without trial, or put into prison, for the crime
talking about freedom and democracy. The All-India Trade Union Congres
the All-India Peasant League, the Depressed Classes Association, the Sikh
the Indian Christians and all Mohammedan organizations, except the Mosle
League, supported the Congress in the stand it took about Britain's attitud

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru intervening on March 14, 1941, as from a Liber
Conference at Bombay, sought to move the British Government to an explic
declaration of Dominion Status at the end of the war, and asked for Defen
and Finance to be transferred immediately to Indian hands. But Mr. Amer
rebuffed him with the most perfunctory of Imperial gestures. A later appe
by the moderates to Mr. Churchill for a settlement elicited no response.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war through Hitler's treacherou
and unprovoked aggression had already changed the perspective of war fo
the subject peoples of India and the colonies, as indeed for the peoples of th
whole world. The progressive Anglo-Soviet alliance made the people o

India eager to participate in the war effort of the threatened democracies. When the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter was declared, most people believed that a new chapter in the collaboration of democratic peoples was opening. Indeed, of its eight points, the third which conceded the right of the people to choose their own government seemed specially significant. Here, then, people thought had been conceded, in unmistakable terms, what India had been demanding for years. But it was not long before the fond hopes of the lovers of democracy and human freedom were dashed to the ground. For, in answer to a question in Parliament, Mr. Churchill declared that this document did not apply to India, Burma and other parts of the British Empire.

Meanwhile, the gravity of the international situation was increased by Japan's sudden offensive against the democracies. The rapidity of the Japanese advance leading to the fall of the Singapore key base opened the doors of the Indian Ocean to the aggressor. General Chiang Kai-Shek visited India at this stage, met the Indian leaders and spoke frankly to Britain, asking for real power to be given to the Indian people.

What the insistent demands of the Indian people and the pressure of democratic opinion in Britain could not do, however, the success of Japanese arms in the far east, in the Dutch East Indies and Burma seemed to achieve:

> The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life, to guard their land from the menace of the invader

—thus began the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on March 11, 1942. And, he informed Parliament that Sir Stafford Cripps would be going out immediately with a Declaration which had the unanimous approval of the British War Cabinet behind it.

The Prime Minister was candid enough to indicate that the new proposals were mainly an attempt to clothe the bare outlines of the declaration of August, 1940. But the fact that Mr. Churchill asked the press, and responsible opinion, to withhold comment and not to prejudice the Lord Privy Seal's delicate mission, as well as the fact that Sir Stafford was professedly a socialist and a friend of the Indian people, made even the shrewdest observers wait with bated breath for the revelation of the terms. Perhaps, perhaps . . . the day of freedom was really dawning for India. Anyhow, everyone was anxious for a settlement.

Sir Stafford flew to India. On arrival he declared, rather tactlessly it seemed, that he had more important business in London and so would only be in India for a fortnight and that the proposals he had brought were the final word of the British war cabinet, admitting of no alteration or revision, as if it was a question of 'take it or leave it.'

Now what were these proposals? The Declaration was in two main parts. The first part laid down that the object of His Majesty's Government is 'the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, with the right to secede from the British Commonwealth later if it so desires.

There was nothing new about this offer of Dominion Status except that this time, at any rate, a date had actually been fixed for the granting of the gift. The date was, of course, after the cessation of hostilities! And yet, as if to show how concrete were the aims of the war cabinet, even the exact procedure for evolving a new constitution had been worked out. All this seemed to suggest that we were getting down to brass tacks after all.

'What is wrong with this offer?' you will ask. 'Why didn't India accept it?' First of all, because, as Gandhi said to Sir Stafford Cripps with characteristic shrewdness, 'it is a post-dated cheque.' The Mahatma did not add, what may have been in his mind, that the old British firm which was offering it may not be there in its *present form* after the war to honour it.

Secondly, if we look at the first part of this offer in passing, it at once reveals the kind of torn and divided India that is envisaged by the British Government. For, if the Indian Dominion was vouchsafed the right of secession, any part or province of India which did not want to enter the Union would be allowed to remain apart and become a Dominion in its own right. With this right to non-accession to the Dominion of any part or province of India, the Moslem League is conceded the demand behind its slogan of a separate Mohammedan state in the north of India, Pakistan or Holy Land; and the whole trend of Indian history towards basic social and political unity is deliberately arrested. The Indian princes who hedged at the acceptance of the last federal scheme would think twice before negotiating new treaties which may in any way confine their autocratic powers. So that we shall have, as an Indian nationalist paper aptly put it, three different Indias: Hindustan, Pakistan and Princestan! And, since all the forces which want to disrupt the unity of India for their own reactionary purposes are given no uncertain measure of encouragement, we might look forward not to one, but to five hundred different Ulsters, acting in the interests of an alien power although that power makes such a brave show of relinquishing control over the internal affairs of India!

And it is not only the 'Ulsterization' or the 'Balkanization' of India which is thus contemplated, but the very procedure about the framing of a new constitution through an electoral college is so conceived as to nullify the substance of the proposal which concedes to Indian people the right to frame their own constitution. The proposed electoral college which is to choose the constitution-making body is to consist of all the members elected to the lower house of the provincial legislature, when a new election takes place after the war under the 1935 Act, and the representatives of the Indian states in proportion to their population. Innocent enough on the surface, this proposal loses its charm if we remember that only about 13 per cent. of the people of India are allowed to vote; and the ingenious devices invented by Britain for separate representation on a communal-religious-sectional basis leave very little elbow room for democracy even in that restricted franchise. If we add to this the proposal that, side by side with the elected delegates to

the electoral college, we shall have the representatives of the Indian princes, *nominated by these autocrats and not elected by the peoples of the states*, we can hardly expect a constitution which will err on the side of democracy. Instead, the princes and partitionists will be enabled to break India up into as many fragments as they like and thus ensure the success of Britain's old policy of *divide et impera.*

But it was not the intricate mechanism of post-war freedom which held the attention of the Indian people; it was rather the wish to mobilize the man-power and the material resources of the country for the immediate defence of India against fascist aggression. So that the Congress was naturally very much more interested in that part of the declaration which dealt with the present. Now, strange as it may seem, all that the British Government offered India in this respect were a few more seats for the leaders of political opinion on the Viceroy's executive council! If one looks at the short clause (a) of the Declaration which grants this boon, one is left gasping in a vain attempt to realize of what the authors of this document could be thinking!

Anyone who has learnt the lessons of the Japanese campaigns in the Far East knows that it was not so much the power of the Japanese military force as the weakness of allied effort and, principally, the indifference of the populations subject to British and Dutch rule, that ensured such easy victories for the fascists. Where, as in the Philippines, the native population had been promised liberation, it was not only sympathetic but it fought with the utmost gallantry and held up the Japanese advance for months. No one can blame the natives of the conquered colonial countries, however, if their bitterness against British or Dutch Imperialist oppression overflowed into acquiescence of, or as in Burma, positive assistance for the new invader.

Therefore, Congress asked for the creation in India of a National Government, such as Sir Stafford Cripps had talked of during the first days of his mission, and the appointment of an Indian Defence Minister who could enthuse and mobilize the people against fascism. The Indian leaders insisted on this also because the example of Russia and China, the only two countries which have put up a successful land struggle against the fascist armies, showed that, apart from the regular army, a guerrilla force of the local people and a large-scale militia alone could successfully counter the unorthodox infiltration tactics imposed on the defence by the fascist enemy. Such a force can only be raised by an Indian Defence Minister whose sympathy with the aspirations of the people would muster the necessary response from the masses.

After elaborate consultations, a formula was evolved by Sir Stafford Cripps. According to this it was suggested that the responsibility for defence should be divided between an Indian Defence Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief who was to be a War Minister. The former would be in charge of public relations, canteens, demobilization and post war reconstruction, petroleum,

the stationery office and social arrangements for receiving foreign missions, etc., while the latter would actually control the armed forces and, inevitably, the conduct of the war in India.

The patent absurdity of expecting an Indian Defence Minister, one of whose chief functions was to organize canteens, to inspire the people to fight for their motherland is obvious. The British Government was not willing to concede any real power to this minister . . . And what is more, whereas Sir Stafford had been talking in the initial stages of the conversations about an Indian National Government, he began to emphasize later that this was the name he had given to the Viceroy's executive council, and that what he had really meant was to invite Indian leaders to sit on this existing council. If it is remembered that seats on this exalted council had already been offered to representative Indians, and been refused, because the Viceroy and his home member form a full quorum in this body and can together throw out any suggestions put before the council, you will realize the true nature of the responsibility offered to the Indian leaders in the interim period. How any self-respecting Indian leader could accept such an abject and humiliating position and then have the face to go to the people to ask for their enthusiasm and support in the war effort is difficult to imagine.

The significant fact is that, though the grounds of their rejection of the declaration may differ in some ways, all the vital parties in India from the Congress, the Moslem League and the Sikhs to the depressed classes and liberals turned down the proposals. In spite of this fact, however, statesmen and publicists in this country have sought to put the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations on the intransigence of the Congress leaders, and the talk of Hindu-Moslem differences has been revived. The publication in the press of the Cripps-Azad correspondence, as well as of the white paper, however, hardly leaves room this time for the familiar perversions of the yellow press. There has been a lot of recrimination against the Congress leaders and it has been alleged that they wanted to impose a 'tyrannical majority on the whole of India when they asked for 'a national Government with cabinet responsibility.' But the unfairness of this slander will be seen if it is realized that the Congress asked for an emergency all-parties National Government responsible to the existing central legislature; and it is conceivable that that would have been better than the existing dictatorship of a Scottish baron of inflexible views! . . . No one can read the balance of rejoinders of the liberal leaders, Sapru and Jayakar, to Sir Stafford's proposals and have any doubt left that while the Congress and other responsible parties sincerely sought a basis for negotiation, the British Government's offer, unanimously agreed upon in London, was unalterable and final and left no room for discussion.

So that the self-congratulatory attitude of those who seek to claim sincerity and integrity for Sir Stafford and the war cabinet alone and, openly or by implication, damn the leaders of India as irresponsible, is revealed as the

sanctimonious humbug of bad propaganda. While they try to show the people of Britain and the United nations how noble was the British offer, they themselves admit that there was nothing new in it, that it substantially repeated the previous declarations of H.M. policy in regard to India, and that the only originality in the scheme was the personal intervention of Sir Stafford Cripps as a sponsor and guarantor of British intentions with regard to India. Since, however, Sir Stafford was not only a faithful messenger but also signified his complete agreement with the British Cabinet's proposals, the only element of novelty was, perhaps, his personal emphasis, though even that seems from his recent broadcast talks to have reverted too closely to type to make the proposals plausible.

'And what now?' you might ask me.

I can only say that while the whole of India will never be conquered by the Japanese, the situation for Bengal and the strategic points on the coast of India has passed the zero hour. And, as India stands with its hands tied behind its back it says that it will not in any way embarrass the British defence, while it will offer moral resistance to embarrass the new invaders. . .

Such is the invidious position to which nationalist India has been forced by a recalcitrant government. I do not want to disguise from you that the gulf between Britain and India has appreciably widened since the Cripps mission, which was not the success several publicists have tried to imply but a signal and historic failure at a juncture when such a failure might harm the allied cause badly.

Perhaps the *facts of history* will create the necessary basis for new negotiations between Britain and India. But, as you know, we are the makers of history and if we, the people of Britain and India, understand the true implications of the present *débâcle* and raise our voices together we can elicit a change . . .

Yours,
MULK RAJ ANAND.

POLAND AND RUSSIA

By Stanislaw Grabski

FOR the last thirty years—and not since July, 1941, only—I have been, and I still am of the opinion that, in the interest of both Russia and Poland, these two nations should be not only good neighbours but also friends sincerely co-operating in the defence of Europe against German aggression. To this view, which I have held for so long, I may add to-day my belief that the present war is creating a new Polish-Russian tradition of brotherhood-in-arms in the joint fighting against the perennial enemy of all Slavs—a tradition which will help to sweep into oblivion old Polish-Russian antagonisms.

As far as Poland is concerned, this goodwill has existed for a very long time. Over a hundred years ago, the grestest Polish poet, Mickiewicz, who was driven into exile by Russian persecution, wrote in France a poem of farewell *To My Russian Friends*. In his *Books of Polish Pilgrims*, which were a Bible of patriotism for many generations of Poles to come, he foretold that, of the three nations which carved up Poland: "Only the Russian nation will see the light, and be forgiven by God." In 1830, when the Poles rose in arms to defend not only their own freedom but also the newly-won liberty of France and Belgium against the tyranny of Tzar Nicholas I, the Polish regiments inscribed on their banners the famous device: "For Your Freedom and Ours." During the last World War, in spite of the fact that Russia had oppressed the Polish population throughout her rule, while in Austria Poles enjoyed a large amount of self-government, the great majority of the Polish people was on the side of Britain, France and Russia in the war against Germany and Austro-Hungary.

But in 1830 the Polish slogan: "For Your Freedom and Ours" did not arouse the faintest echo even in the most liberal circles of Russian public opinion. The greatest Russian poet, Pushkin, wrote then a poem in which he attacked English and French writers and politicians for their defence of the Polish rising, because, he said, the essence of the Polish-Russian conflict was "whether the Slav streamlets are all to merge in one Russian sea, or if the sea itself is to dry up." Pushkin thus mirrored the deep and almost mystical belief of the whole Russian ruling class of *boyars* and bureaucrats that it was Russia's historic mission to unite all the Slav nations under the sceptre of the Orthodox Tzars. Almost all the Russian writers of the 19th century, even those as liberal in other respects as Dostoievski, were inimical

to the fight of the Polish nation for its liberation from the Tzarist yoke. In fact, there were only three great men in Russia who fully understood the impulse of the Poles to recover their national independence, and gave it their full support. These were Hertzen, the leader of the Russian liberals in the fifties of the last century and editor of the famous Russian paper *Kolokol* (The Bell), published in London and circulated secretly in Russia; Bakunin, the friend of Marx in the First International and Lenin, who made Marx's theories realistic in Russia.

On October 3, 1918, Lenin signed and communicated to the German Government a resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars denouncing the treaties of 1772, 1793 and 1795, partitioning Poland, and also all subsequent treaties and acts of state concerning that part of Poland under Russian rule.

The Poles, like every other nation, have many faults, but they have one virtue—perhaps because they were often abandoned during the hundred and fifty years of their slavery—they never forget the friendship and assistance shown to them. For this reason, in 1919, when the Tzarist General Denikin, who headed the counter-revolutionary movement against Lenin's Russia, asked the Polish Commander-in-Chief at that time, Marshal Pilsudski, to join forces against the Red Armies, the Polish Government rejected this proposal, nothwithstanding the fact that it was backed by one of the principal Allied powers, and that Polish and Red Armies were then fighting each other. This attitude of the Polish Government may be explained by its confidence, shared by all Polish parliamentary leaders, that it would be possible to terminate the skirmishes between Poles and Russians, and to reach a lasting and honest understanding with Soviet Russia. The Poles considered that Soviet Russia had, by the above-mentioned resolution of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, definitely abandoned the traditional and aggressive Tzarist Imperialism. They thought, furthermore, that such an understanding with the old Russia would have little chance of enduring.

For what issue were the Polish and Soviet armies fighting in 1918 and 1919? For the lands which at the time of the Polish partitions were detached by Empress Catherine II from the Polish Commonwealth. When, after the collapse of the Central Powers, the German Armies had left these territories, occupied by them in 1918, the Polish Armies advanced from West to East in order to reunite all the lands of the old Polish Kingdom. Simultaneously, the Red Army invaded these lands from the East. Although the Soviet Government had waived its legal claims and titles to these territories by denouncing the Partition Treaties, it considered it necessary in the interests of world revolution to extend its authority as far to the west as possible. It should be borne in mind that at that time Bela Kun had carried out a Communist *coup d'état* in Hungary, while in Germany numerous and sanguinary battles were in progress between Communists and Social Democrats in various large cities.

In the 14th century the Russian, White Russian and Ruthenian principali-

ties, ruled by princes of the House of Ruryk, and subjugated two hundred years earlier by the Mongols, began to shake off the Tartar yoke. The eastern principalities were united under the sceptre of the Dukes and later Tzars of Moscow, while the western and southern petty dukedoms in the river-basin of the Dnieper were united by the Grand Dukes of Lithuania, and after the Polish-Lithuanian union of 1385 came under the Polish crown. At the end of the 18th century, White Russia and Western Ukraina were as closely knit culturally and politically with Poland, as Scotland with England. But during the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 Russia annexed all the Polish lands east of the rivers Bug and Zbrucz. Notwithstanding the partitions however, the bonds between Poland and the territories annexed by Russia remained as close as ever. The greatest Polish patriots of the last two centuries were born in these lands: Kósciuszko, the leader of the insurrection of 1794, Traugutt, leader of the rising of 1863, the poets Mickiewicz and Slowacki, the novelists Kraszewski and Sienkiewicz, and the pianist Paderewski. It was in the country around Wilno that the participation of peasants in the Polish rising of 1863 was most pronounced. However, one hundred and fifty years of ruthless Russification, particularly severe after the collapse of the 1863 rising, could not fail to produce some effect. For instance, Poles were forbidden to buy land even from other Poles, and signs were placed in all offices and schools forbidding the use of the Polish language under heavy penalties. As one gets further to the East of Wilno, which still remains a strong centre of Polish civilization and political thought, the weaker grow the links between these lands and Poland, and the stronger becomes the influence of Russian civilization.

For this reason, the Polish National Committee in Paris, which was recognized in 1917 by all the Allies as the legal representative of the Polish nation at war with Germany and Austria, decided in a spirit of sound realism to claim the return to Poland of less than one-half of the lands seized by Russia at the time of the partitions.

This was a very modest programme. Its modesty will be fully apparent in the light of the fact that, on January 28, 1920, the Council of Peoples' Commissars proposed to "The Polish Government and People" an armistice on a line well to the east of the frontiers claimed by Poland; this line ran through the towns of Polock, Borysów, Cudnów and Bar, and the Council also suggested that this line should be adopted as a basis for the peace negotiations with regard to a new frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

At that time I was Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Parliament and I can state authoritatively that all the Polish parties were decidedly in favour of accepting these proposals. The Polish Government entered into preliminary negotiations with the Soviet Government—these were however soon broken off by a difference of opinion as to the choice of a place in which to hold this Peace Conference. The Polish High Command

suggested the town of Borysów for this purpose, while the Soviet High Command was absolutely opposed to it. The break-down of negotiations in their preliminary stages for such a trifling reason was possible only because the decisive voice both in the Polish and Soviet High Commands belonged to men who, against the will of their peoples, desired to prolong the war. In Poland, Marshal Pilsudski considered it imperative not to deny assistance to the Ukrainian nationalists, then fighting under Petlura for Ukrainian independence and liberation from Moscow. In Russia, Trotsky claimed that it was the duty of the Red Armies, equal to that of destroying the so-called White counter-revolution, to break the barrier formed by Poland, which had made it impossible for Russia to afford effective help to the German Communists. After the winter lull, early in the spring of 1920, severe fighting broke out on the Polish-Russian front. In the first stage, the Polish Armies were successful, and occupied Kiev, but later the Russian counter-offensive forced them to retire almost to the gates of Warsaw. But in the three-day battle of Warsaw, the Russian Armies were utterly defeated and driven back in confusion to Minsk.

In spite of this victory Poland did not aim in the least at destroying the Red Army, or at imposing humiliating peace-terms on Russia. While military operations were still in progress, Poland opened peace negotiations with Russia, first at Minsk and then at Riga. The Polish peace delegation, in which were represented all the Polish Parliamentary parties, at once proposed to base the Peace Treaty on the following principles:

(a) A peace without victors or vanquished.
(b) Equal consideration for the vital interests of the two countries.
(c) The delineation of a frontier which would draw an equitable line through the territories inhabited by mixed populations, which had belonged to Poland before 1772, and were annexed by Russia during the partitions—a line which would end once and for all the age-old Polish-Russian conflict with regard to these territories.

As a member of this Polish peace delegation, I am glad to say that the Soviet delegation was no less anxious than the Polish one to put an end to the frontier disputes between Poland and Russia and to provide a firm basis for good relations between the two countries. It was the spirit of Lenin, and not of Trotsky, which inspired the Soviet delegation. The address of M. Joffe, the Chairman of the Soviet peace delegation, at Riga on the occasion of the signing of the Peace treaty on March 18, 1921, was not merely courteous but truthful, when he said: "The atmosphere at Riga was always such that it assisted the conduct of the negotiations and facilitated our arrival at the desired result." In particular, the tracing of a new frontier was accomplished without any friction. The frontier-line proposed by the Polish delegation was accepted by the Soviet delegation after a discussion lasting only one hour. Nor was this surprising. Although the Polish Armies continued their advance, and the Russians their retreat, the Polish delegation proposed a frontier-line which, at many points, was a hundred kilometres

west of the line proposed by the Soviet Government in January, 1920, before the final armed clash.

As I was Chairman of the Frontier Committee of the Polish Delegation, I was often attacked later by some sections of the Polish public opinion for the excessive moderation of our territorial claims at that time. They were in fact extremely moderate. The Treaty of Riga returned to Poland only one-fourth of the area seized by Russia at the time of partitions, and left about 120,000 square miles of lands formerly Polish to Russia. But the Polish Delegation was seriously and sincerely anxious to "pay equal attention to the vita interests of both sides." We agreed with the Soviet Delegation that Ukraina was a vital Russian interest, while White Russia and the territory of Wilno was a Polish one. For this reason, Poland returned to Russia a part of Ukrainian territory which was at that time already occupied by the Polish forces, while Soviet Russia declared, in Article I of the Peace Treaty, that "the problem of the territories under dispute between Lithuania and Poland is a problem concerning these two countries only," and surrendered to Poland two counties at that time not yet occupied by the Polish forces, thus giving Poland a common frontier with Latvia. Poland did not however claim the whole of White Russia for herself. She left the White Russian capital, Minsk, to Russia. She considered that her vital interests were limited to the restoration to Poland of that part only of White Russia where the majority of the population was Catholic and clearly gravitated towards Polish culture. In the whole area of the Wilno territory and Polish White Russia, 52.5 per cent. of the population is Roman Catholic, 37 per cent. Orthodox and 9 per cent. Jewish. For scores of years these Catholics resisted the Tzarist Russian authorities when the latter tried to suppress Polish sermons and hymns in the churches.

I do not regret that I and my colleagues of the Polish Delegation were so moderate at that time. Subsequent events have proved us right. Every conflict between Poland and Russia can be advantageous only to Germany. It is to the vital interest of both countries and peoples to establish a working relationship, and even friendship. The best proof of this sincere desire on the part of the Polish nation is afforded by its moderation in territorial claims on Russia after the victory of 1920. Another proof is the enrolment in mass to-day of Polish volunteers in the Polish Army in Russia. All these volunteers have had experience of Soviet deportations, imprisonment and concentration camps.

Poland has no territorial claims on Soviet Russia. Furthermore, though Polish ideals are vastly different from those of the U.S.S.R., the Polish nation sincerely desires the strength of the Soviet State, and the happiness of its peoples. Poland believes that a Russia following the path of progress and civilization will rid herself completely of the tradition of aggressive imperialism and will become a pillar of world peace.

Actually, Poland is afraid of one thing only as far as Russia is concerned: namely, that the war, which quite naturally revived a fervent Russian nationalism, should also revive the dormant Russian greed for neighbouring lands, especially those peopled by Slavs. Stalin however is the heir of the genius, Lenin, not of the short-sighted doctrinaire, Trotsky. During General Sikorski's visit to Moscow in December, 1941, Stalin told him that he desired to see a strong Poland established.

In fact, a strong Poland, friendly to Russia, would be the best guarantee to the latter against any German aggression in the future. Of course, those who speak of a strong Poland could not contemplate weakening her by the seizure of a part of her eastern borderlands. The U.S.S.R. is so vast that an addition of a few million people would be of little importance. But should the same few millions be severed from Poland she would be greatly weakened, and any such act would provoke a sense of deep wrong amongst the Poles, a feeling which would render any good and friendly relations in the future impossible. The security argument, namely that Russia must have more advantageous frontiers to the West for strategic reasons, is a fallacy: it is a fact that Soviet authorities had to deport to the interior of Russia almost two million Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians and Jews, that is to say, about 15 per cent. of the population of Eastern Poland under Soviet occupation, to secure their rule there. It is obviously much better to have a friendly neighbour than to control a territory so uneasily held that such measures have to be applied.

The Polish National Council, which replaces a Polish Parliament in Britain, unanimously adopted on March 17, 1942, a resolution to the following effect:

> An honest understanding between Poland and Russia is equally necessary and useful to both parties, and the Council will support the Polish Government's policy aiming at the liquidation of the points of friction still extant between Poland and Russia.

I do not doubt that all such points of friction will be eliminated if the principles proclaimed at the Kremlin by Stalin and General Sikorski of full respect for voluntarily incurred pledges are properly observed. I think that the Polish National Council was right in stating, in the latter part of its resolution:

> The first and indispensable condition of a working partnership between two nations and of their friendship must be the mutual confidence that neither of them will ever re-open disputes from the moment they are settled by valid treaties.

I can assure the British public that on Poland's side no one intends to reopen any such disputes.

(After Professor Grabski was released from a Russian prison when the Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed he came to England and is now Chairman of the Polish National Council.)

A FATEFUL SUMMER

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

ALTHOUGH the war has become world wide, the number of theatres in which vital issues will be fought out or where new dangers may develop, tends to diminish.

On land the Russian situation dominates all others, for Germany has so far entangled herself that there, and there alone, can she hope to clear the road to further enterprises which might lead to decisive results. In the Far East the strategic issue turns on depriving Japan of control of sea communications in Eastern waters; land operations, disturbing as their results have been, are not of vital importance, except so far as they affect the naval situation. The Battle of the Atlantic is bound to continue with varying fortune, but universally as its influences are felt there is little prospect that it will be the scene of decisive encounters. Air warfare so far as it may have decisive results, independently achieved, centres over Germany.

It is operations in these theatres which must engage our attention during the coming fateful summer. Certain theatres where at one time vital dangers threatened have been eliminated, either temporarily or completely from the picture. Temporarily at least, invasion of these islands, in view of our vastly increased strength in armaments and in the air and of Germany's commitments in Russia, is a danger that has receded; although as a desperate venture, promising the most decisive results if successful, it is a possibility necessitating the fullest precautionary measures consistent with offensive plans. In particular, if Germany had to decide to cut her losses in Russia an attack on Britain might be attempted as a forlorn hope. Invasion of Spain and collaboration with Vichy to secure control of the Straits of Gibraltar and the North African seaboard striking at the Mediterranean and Cape routes, appeared at one time to rank high on the German offensive programme, but full exploitation of the plan is hardly feasible in view of the Russian entanglement and the entry of the U.S.A. into the war. The possibility that the Middle East should become the objective of German major offensive operations—the much talked of great pincer operation– must almost certainly now be made dependent on what can be achieved in Russia. Last year a drive towards Iraq and Egypt through Turkey was considered to be too risky an undertaking in spite of the fact that our Middle East forces had been weakened by Rommel's counter-offensive and by reverses in Greece, because Russia was a potential danger. Surely it must now be out of the question in view of our stronger position and of the offensive power Russia has revealed. It is true that the Red Army has been driven back and is no

longer an immediate menace to the communications of armies operating through the Balkans and Turkey, but, on the other hand, in view of Russia's growing offensive power, a defensive attitude in Russia would not liberate German resources sufficient to sustain long-range and probably prolonged operations through Turkey. Much less would German resources suffice to conduct major offensives in both directions. It seems clear, therefore, that Germany has no alternative to a renewal of her offensive in Russia with the primary object of destroying the offensive power of the Red Army. The complete destruction of that army can, after last year's experience, hardly be considered by the most sanguine German to be feasible, but if it were deprived of offensive power then a drive towards Egypt might be undertaken.

The most obvious and quickest way of destroying Russia's offensive potentialities is to secure possession of her oil resources and of as much of her industrial organization as can be reached. Under present conditions it is probably now more important to Germany to deprive Russia of her oil resources than to secure possession of them for her own use. That, I think, is the main reason why it must be expected that the main German offensive will be directed towards Caucasia. A renewal of attacks on Moscow must of course also be expected, if only with the intention of engaging Russian reserves and protecting the left flank of the southern drive from counter-attacks. There is, of course, also the necessity of relieving the "hedgehog" key points now so closely threatened by the Russians. North of the Valdai hills it would not be surprising to find the Reichswehr standing on the defensive, content merely to maintain the investment of Leningrad. Whether Stalin will be satisfied to await the development of German plans or will attempt to anticipate them we must wait to learn. That he has no intention of relying on passive defence or further evasion strategy is, however, clear from his confident pronouncement, and our clear duty and interest is to do everything possible to sustain his offensive power and not merely to take such action as might reduce the weight of the expected German attack.

Although it seems certain that the main theatre for Germany's summer offensive must be in Russia, it would be perfectly sound strategy for her to take the offensive in secondary theatres provided that it would not make exorbitant demands on her resources, and that there were objectives which would affect the issues in the main arena.

Does Libya stand the test of these provisos? Are we to expect Rommel to undertake a fresh offensive and if so under what circumstances? For an isolated undertaking it would seem unlikely that he possesses sufficient strength to achieve any success of importance, and to reinforce him while his sea communications remain precarious would probably prove costly with the percentage of losses rising as the target increased in size. Nor would it appear that an offensive by him would have any diversionary influence in the Russian theatre. Under existing circumstances his rôle therefore is probably defensive, denying us the air fields of Cyrenaica and access to Tripolitania,

which have such an important bearing on our use of Mediterranean sea communications. The attacks on Malta, presumably undertaken in order to lessen risks on communications with Libya, may have been made in order to pass sufficient reinforcements and stores to him to render him self-sufficient before all available German aircraft are needed in Russia.

There is, however, another theatre where it has always seemed to me that Germany might open a new offensive, that is in European Turkey with the limited object of securing passage through the Straits. Secondary action of that character would have a direct bearing on the main operations in Russia and might also give Rommel an opportunity to undertake diversionary action of importance. The arguments that appeal to me are that unless the Straits are opened to the passage of Italian ships and German submarines there is no immediate prospect of depriving the Russian Fleet of its dominating position in the Black Sea, the importance of which has perhaps not been sufficiently recognized. It no doubt made essential contributions to the prolonged defence of Odessa, to the defence of Sebastopol and in general to Crimean operations. Moreover, by denying the use of sea communications to the Germans it has thrown a heavy strain on their southern land communications, a strain which will increase if the main German effort is directed towards Caucasia. The distance from the Bulgarian frontier to the Straits is so short and Bulgarian airfields have been so thoroughly reorganized that a blitzkrieg attack with a minimum of warning might hope to achieve rapid results and, with the objective limited, not entail prolonged operations or heavy demands on resources needed in the main theatre. The co-operation of the Bulgarian Army could be relied on and should the coup succeed it might be made largely responsible for the defence of ground gained. The Turkish defences are undoubtedly strong and there is presumably little chance that Turkey would be taken entirely by surprise, but in a limited arena paratroops might play an important part. Failure of the coup would not entail great risks, for the Turkish bridgehead in Europe does not present many facilities for counter-offensive action. Turkey, however, would become a base for British aircraft.

Whatever course a war with Turkey might take British assistance would of course be given her, but a diversionary offensive by Rommel might limit its scope. A limited offensive against Turkey would of course be of a very different order from an attempt to force a passage through Turkish territory to the Middle East, but, on the other hand, any bridgehead secured by the limited operations would be of great value to Germany in case the course of events in Russia made a drive towards the Middle East a more practicable proposition than it is at present. The opportunity to by-pass Turkey with the acquiescence of the Vichy Government in Syria having been lost, a pincer attack on Egypt would now in any case almost certainly involve an attack on Turkey. These may be idle speculations, but if I were a Turk I should not place much value on von Papen's assurances.

THE WAR AT SEA

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE position in the Indian seas to the westward of Burma remains in dispute, though to the eastward the Japanese have as yet a practically undisputed command of the sea. The last month however has witnessed checks to the Japanese advance at sea, though their land advance continues and will continue until the allied navies can effectively interrupt the lines of supply of the enemy's armies in Burma and the islands of the South Pacific. But there is ground for solid satisfaction in certain of the recent events. The defences of Ceylon disappointed the hopes of the attackers of Trincomali and Colombo where, it is assumed, the enemy expected to repeat their success of Pearl Harbour; and it is not without some feelings of reassurance that we read that steps were taken as early as last November to strengthen the defences of the island, before the Japanese aggression began. Again, in the approaches to Australia the combined forces of Australia and the United States have held up the attacks on Port Moresby and inflicted what appears to have been a sensible amount of loss on both the air forces and sea transport of the enemy in New Guinea and at Rabaul: while the action in the Coral Sea (about which the details are still undisclosed at the time of writing) gives the impression of having resulted in the repulse of a formidable combined movement against Australia or some position in the approach to that continent. The battle was clearly indecisive in that the great object in battle—the destruction of the enemy's fighting force—was not attained. But indecisive battles have often had a positive result in war at sea. Thus the indecisive battle between Graves and De Grasse was tactically indecisive; but inasmuch as Graves was unable to deprive de Grasse of the command of the sea, Yorktown fell. The battle of Ushant was tactically indecisive, but the failure of the British fleet to destroy the enemy prevented the help that was needed in the American seas from being sent thither, and from that followed the misfortunes of the British arms. So, in this engagement in the Coral Sea, if its result has been to inflict such losses on the would-be invading forces that the purpose they had in view has had to be abandoned, for the time at least, the effect may reach far. It is plain that time is of no small importance to the enemy, and the delay which appears to have been imposed on him is all a breathing space to the allies in which the defences can be strengthened and the preparations for an offensive brought nearer to completion. Finally, there is much ground for satisfaction in the

expedition to Madagascar. There we have been given evidence of fore thought—the Prime Minister has told us that the preparations took three months to make. Secrecy, that essential element in such operations, was completely preserved; a most refreshing sign, for how many of our overseas enterprises have failed for want of it! The force that was sent was not cut fine but was decisively superior to that which it was expected it would have to meet. Nothing, in fact, was left to chance in the preparations, while the conduct of the landing was marked by the fullest co-operation of the land air and sea forces and by skill, dash and determination. The anxiety with which Mr. Churchill tells us he read every mention of the word "Madagascar" can be well understood. Though it is not easy to define any precise limits to reticence in pointing out spots in the various theatres of war in which hard blows may be struck there is a danger in too good guesses and of putting the enemy on his guard, even though he, accustomed as he is to imposing complete silence on forthcoming events, may be lulled into security by such references, deeming it impossible that they would be allowed to appear if there were any real intention of executing such designs. In fact, a judicious admixture of fact and fiction in forecasts and suggestions is probably the most useful course, and the more places about which he may be made anxious the better.

Napoleon's saying that war is a matter of positions has often been referred to in these columns. Japan, during the five months in which she has been at war, has observed that dictum with consistency. She has steadily improved her positional strength. Hong Kong, Singapore, the Dutch Islands New Guinea, Rabaul, the Solomons, Rangoon and more recently Akyab—all these have fallen to her arms and put her in a very strong position both to pursue her military offensive and to conduct, when the time comes, her defence against expulsion from her conquests. The allies have been forced continually to fall back, in the South to the Australian ports, in the Bay of Bengal to Ceylon. These they hold, and their hold on them gives every sign of growing stronger. To those positions they have now added Madagascar. But the whole strategy has been of necessity defensive; it could not be otherwise with the command of the sea so completely in Japanese hands after the losses at Pearl Harbour and in the China seas. Wars, as everyone has now discovered, cannot be won by defence alone, though there were people not very long ago who talked about "defensive" and "offensive" types of ships and weapons. Nor, however, can they be won without defence, and to secure the positions while the strength needed for the offensive is being brought into being and to the desired spots is an obvious necessity. It is not unreasonable to feel some confidence that that force is building up. The naval construction of the United States is proceeding faster than it was either scheduled to be or expected to proceed. When the repairs shall have been completed, and the new construction have passed into service, the initiative should undoubtedly pass into the hands of the allies, provided always that

they establish as the primary object of their strategy the winning of the command of the sea. Given that command, the armies of Japan, scattered as they are between China, Burma, the Indian Ocean, the islands of the China Sea and Australia, and dependent upon the sea for their supplies and maintenance, will be in danger. Given that command, too, the supplies which Russia requires for her armies will reach her without fail both in the Arctic and by way of the Cape and the Persian Gulf; so too will those for the British and their other allies in Egypt and the Middle East. The pressure on Germany from her isolation will steadily increase. We may indeed compare the reasons which drove Napoleon to attack Russia in 1812 with those which sent Hitler on the same course last year. The damning Molotoff Memorandum on German atrocities in Russia gives some indication of Germany's needs in the orders issued to the invading armies for the plunder of the country. The economic plan provided for the shipment to Germany of all stocks of raw materials and commodities. "All raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods which we need must be withdrawn from the market by means of orders, requisitions and confiscations." All platinum, rubber and magnesium must be seized, all stocks of provisions, articles for general and personal consumption, clothing, boots, leather, beasts, agricultural implements—everything in fact of which the Germans are in need must be taken. In the Secret Document called the "Green File" the aim is unblushingly set out. "Obtain as much food and oil for Germany as possible; this is the main economic task of the campaign." It is not without interest to compare this policy of plunder with the arguments which the German jurists—and it must be added some English and other writers as well—employed to effect the abolition of the capture of what is called "private property" at sea. In land warfare, so these folk asserted, private property is exempt from capture. The same rule should apply to sea warfare and capture at sea prohibited. It is to be hoped that we have now heard the last of such nonsense. It was the pressure of sea power which drove the enemy into forestalling the attack which, it is plain, he would eventually have made upon Russia when he should have disposed of his other enemies, in particular Great Britain: and that attack has resulted, we are told by the Prime Minister, in losses to the German armies exceeding those of the whole of the last war.

Unfortunate and disquieting as the situation is in India there are many encouraging signs in the checks and delays that have been imposed on the enemy. There is further encouragement in the purposes and results of the recent aerial operations, which have tended more directly than hitherto towards strengthening the command of the sea. Rostock and Lubeck may both be properly regarded as nodal points in the sea warfare, places in which the instruments of sea warfare are produced. Trondheim has had a visit, and, though the German cruisers from Brest succeeded in regaining their home ports through the Channel, it is now known that both the battle-cruisers are in dock, the one at Kiel, the other at Gdynia, as a result of the

attacks made on them in Brest and in their passage up Channel. These contributory events must not blind us, however, to the pressing need of obtaining command of the sea by the actual and direct destruction of the enemy's fighting sea forces, including those in the air, which are playing so important a part both in the eastern seas and in the Mediterranean. Our own air forces in the East are performing most essential work in the strategy of delay, and that part will be even greater when the surface forces have regained their strength and can begin their offensive with the destruction of the Japanese navy in view. The loss of three destroyers in a single air attack off Crete is an unwelcome reminder of the need of the navy in its air components and it may well be of some lack even yet of a unified command. It is interesting to note that the United States have experienced the need for an unified command of the forces, sea and air, engaged in the operations of defence of trade off their coasts, in precisely the same manner as we experienced it in the early stages of the Atlantic Battle. At the beginning of American participation in the war the American Army planes, like those of the Royal Air Force, were acting in "co-operation" with the vessels of the Navy; but though it was said as it was said here that the co-operation was full and complete, the interchange of information unrestricted and the cordiality all that could be desired, in practice the organization was found to yield results so disappointing that, by a joint decree issued by the Army and Navy Departments on March 28, all the Army planes engaged in the work at sea along the coasts, both in the East and in the West, were placed under the naval command. So the evidence continues to mount up in the plainest fashion that the subjective conception of the position of aircraft in naval operations must be substituted for the objective conception of the purpose to be fulfilled: that it is not the nature of the instrument or the manner by which it moves that decides its place in the category of fighting services, but the object that has to be attained. We shall make a great stride in our progress towards the achievement of commanding the sea when this fact becomes recognized, and with that a step towards ultimate victory.

CHANSON LIBRE

By C. C. Gould

O SONG sung,
Winging,
Distant lands among;
And still bringing,
When the singer's dead
And his last note said,
Minute influences
To senses
Now perhaps old,
But young when the song was told;
Unfledged, unshorn,
Could be, not even born.

Silence then is not
Sound-vacuum
Or voice-forgot.
In the unheard hum
Things whisper
You know no thing about:
The baby lisper
In his tenement
A thousand miles away;
Still Attic calms
Born on far wind's chordless shout
Despite the jackboot
Of the rowdy conqueror;
His voice too, sore
With the loud oppression
Of dumb hurt;
Owls that hoot,
And echoes that die,
Forgotten as the day at midnight
Unwitting Memory can be curt
And maim confession;
And ears hear things,
Yet not knowing that the silence sings;
And eyes be open, yet enjoy not sight.

Sounds are as ripples,
As stipples
Of rain
That pain
Quiet pools to circles,
A myriad, ring and core,—
The ring the ripple,
And the core the stipple.
Stay!—Disturbance is no more:
The reason for the ripple has gone;
It is soon done.
Sounds are adornment of the silences,
As songs that have been sung:
We hear their passages,
As we watch spear, flung,
Until no longer seen,
But known to be still flying.
To us it has been,
Is dying
In thought of sight;
But elsewhere others watch its flight.
"Somewhere the arrow strikes to ground"
You say, "The same with sound."
I disagree

You see
A stretched string plucked
Keeps on forever murmuring,
Unending, and still singing.
Echoes flung into the distance
Do not die,
. . not die,
. . . . . die,
They sigh
In sleep elsewhere,
Not despair
Existence.

O Sung Songs,
Sleeping in my heart!
Events apart
Raise up the hell-bent jealousies,
The memories
Of sharp divisions
And of deep decisions,
Hard edicts over little things,—
Each sings.
The final bourn of sound is the cased
heart.

Sensations lie there, half-asleep,
But ready to dart,
Challenging heavily,
Ox-strong,
And long.

O Songs *un*sung!
Drive in among
The unturned ordure,
Sweeten for fresh verdure,
Spread wetting hoses
And raise roses.
O Songs sung
Distant lands among,
Distant times among,
Circle round my head,
Show you are not dead,
Speak into my ear
Like a messenger;
And then start
Things long said,
Thoughts long dead,
In my head,
In my heart,
O Songs sung!

MODERN PROSE FORMS

IV. Travellers' Tales

By Eric Gillett

THERE has always been a demand for travellers' tales. Ulysses, Drake, Columbus, Coryat, Munchausen, Robinson Crusoe, and James Boswell are only a handful among the thousands who have found eager readers for their records of adventure. In pre-war days Aunt Augusta entertained a crowded Village Institute with her experiences (illustrated by lantern slides) on a cruise sponsored by the Hellenic Club. Bert and Alf thrilled a deferential circle at the Local with their account of a day trip to Boulogne by paddle steamer. Victorian travellers, with the exception of Kinglake, Waterton, Darwin, Russel Wallace, and a few others were inclined to make rather heavy weather of their adventures. There was too much moralizing and an almost alarming wealth of unimportant detail. With the present century the literature of travel may be said to have come fully into its own. Ever increasing facilities have made the world a very much smaller place. Air transport has brought the remotest parts of the earth within a few days of each other so that efficient young men and women armed with fountain pens and typewriters can serve up their experiences piping hot. All these innovations and improvements have made writers more wary. Dr. Cook discovered that it was not enough to say that he had been to the North Pole. It did not take long before his unwise assertions were disproved and himself discredited. Since his day dense tropical jungles and desert fastnesses have been traversed by intrepid ladies in shorts, who came not as single spies but in ever increasing battalions.

T. E. Lawrence once remarked that a foreign background made some Englishmen more inflexibly English. He was thinking of C. M. Doughty, the author of *Arabia Deserta*. Many competent critics consider this to be the greatest of all English travel books. There is something craggy and austere like the Arabian landscape, about Doughty's style. The man himself was like a rugged monument. His personality towered. It is not surprising that the Arabs took to him and venerated his memory long after he had left them.

Arabia Deserta is not a book from which to hack chunks for quotation. It is an extraordinary achievement, born out of its own time. It is the

story of the life and habits of a remarkable people; it was used as a military text book in the last war and it will be read as a literary masterpiece many years hence. It can never be popular. There are too many foreign words and terms. Doughty made no concessions to his readers, but his book is a tonic, albeit a bitter one, and there is no better book for reading to-day.

It would be almost impossible to find a greater contrast in style than between those of Doughty and Henry James. James was one of the most urbane of writers and of travellers. He wrote at length of his experiences in France, England and the United States. His *Little Tour in France* is a miniature masterpiece, and is widely known. Much less attention has been paid to *English Hours*, charmingly illustrated by Joseph Pennell, which appeared in 1905. This book embodies the fine freshness of its author's earlier impressions of this country. Here is a lovely passage on English cathedrals, evoked by a visit to Chester:

> The great tower . . . rises high enough to seem to belong, as cathedral towers should, to the far-off air that vibrates with the chimes and the swallows, and to square serenely, east and west and south and north, its embossed and fluted sides. English cathedrals within, are apt at first to look pale and naked; but after a while, if the proportions be fair and the spaces largely distributed, when you perceive the light beating softly down from the cold clerestory and your eye measures caressingly the tallness of columns and the hollowness of arches, and lingers on the old genteel inscriptions of mural marbles and brasses; and, above all, when you become conscious of that sweet cool mustiness in the air which seems to haunt these places as the very climate of Episcopacy, you may grow to feel that they are less the empty shells of a departed faith than the abodes of a faith which may still affirm a presence and awaken echoes.

It has always seemed to me that nothing like adequate justice has been done to James's sense of humour. *English Hours* has numerous happy examples of it.

So much attention has been paid to Henry James's influence upon contemporary fiction that it is worth noting that it is to be found also in at least two books of travel. One is the late Dixon Scott's far too little known book on Stratford-on-Avon, Warwick, and Leamington, certainly inspired by "The Birthplace." The other is Miss Rebecca West's *Black Lamb* and *Grey Falcon*, which has been fully reviewed too recently to need attention here.

A literary traveller who delighted the young intellectuals in the early nineteen hundreds and has continued to entertain innumerable readers ever since is Mr. Hilaire Belloc. Beer and ballads, virile conversations and deep, unaffected piety, long tramps are most prominent features of *The Path to Rome*, and *Four Men in Sussex*. Belloc probably derived from Stevenson who in his turn owed much to Hazlitt, but Belloc founded a school of his own, of whom Mr. J. B. Morton is a shining example.

I was told recently that among writers who have died in recent years

Joseph Conrad is one whose work is still widely read. There is no doubt that whatever one may think of the novels, and some of them are too highly-wrought for their plot content, some short stories, and both *A Personal Record*, and *The Mirror of the Sea*, are exquisite examples of this author's work. Nowhere else does he write with such passionate frankness about the sea:

> The sea—this truth must be confessed—has no generosity. No display of manly qualities—courage, hardihood, endurance, faithfulness— has ever been known to touch its irresponsible consciousness of power. The ocean has the conscienceless temper of a savage autocrat spoiled by much adulation. He cannot brook the slightest appearance of defiance, and has remained the irreconcilable enemy of ships and men ever since ships and men had the unheard-of audacity to go afloat together in the face of his frown . . . the most amazing wonder of the deep is its unfathomable cruelty.

Surely no one has ever written with greater feeling and sympathy about ships unless it is the present Poet Laureate. W. H. Hudson and R. B. Cunninghame Grahame had South American sympathies in common. Cunninghame Grahame's travel sketches are well worth reading. They are sensitive and vivid, but Hudson was not only a born naturalist and traveller. He was also a writer of great gifts, which are not at first apparent because of the deceptive simplicity of his style. *A Shepherd's Life* gives pictures of Salisbury Plain which have never been equalled. *The Land's End*, from the literary point of view at any rate, does full justice to the marine beauties of the Cornish coast, and in numerous other books Hudson has written with an almost scientific precision on nature and the countryside. His knowledge of two worlds gave him a rich store for comparison and reminiscence which give light and colour to his writings.

One of the most interesting and enigmatic among senior contemporary writers is Norman Douglas, whose last published work was, I think, his 'autobiographical excursion,' *Looking Back*, which came out in 1933. Mr. Douglas kept for many years a box of calling cards not only those of friendly visitors to the house but also those collected on journeys, and as he looked at them memories of his friends returned to him. This simple formula for writing a book of reminiscences has proved an adequate peg on which to hang some most unconventional tales of past experiences. *Looking Back* contains glimpses of people and places so strange and varied that it is a catalogue of the unexpected. It would not be unfair to say that all Douglas's travel books come into that category. He has great erudition and is one of the most companionable of writers. He has the ability to extract confidence and friendship from the most unlikely people and he is one of the most resourceful of travellers. *Sirenland, Alone, Together, Fountains in the Sand* are among his best contributions to the literature of travel, and there is nothing else

like them in English. Douglas is a master of relevant digression. He may and often does fly off at a tangent, but his digressions spring quite naturally from his mood of the moment.

Of the many books which dealt autobiographically with travel and war experiences during the last war, the most notable are Mr. Compton Mackenzie's account of his experiences in the Mediterranean, Henry Nevinson's war books, T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, and Mr. Brett Young's *Marching on Tanga*. It would be difficult to fit these books into a single section. All their authors show determination, some subtlety, and a great capacity for endurance. They display different facets of the British temper in face of adversity, but it would take a good-sized volume to examine them critically. Their value has been proved. It is enough to commend them here.

In an earlier article I wrote of Dame Ethel Smyth's exceptional talents as a writer. *A Three-Legged Tour in Greece* shows her at her liveliest. Dame Ethel adopted her unusual title because it seemed to her that a tour carried out by a great-aunt and her great-niece has something of a three-legged race about it. The exuberance of the younger partner has to be toned down to the scale of his yoke-fellow—who thereupon becomes equal to feats of pace and endurance that could not be performed in single harness. Like those of Mr. Norman Douglas Dame Ethel's books read like very witty and vivacious talk.

In them you will find nothing of the rich intensity which is the principal characteristic of D. H. Lawrence's descriptive pieces. In almost all of them the phallic obsession seems to be lurking just round the corner, but Lawrence was a great painter in words. There is a dark brilliance in his descriptions which is stamped with his unmistakable imprint. This is nowhere more definite than in his *Mornings in Mexico* with its wonderful and thrilling pictures of the Indian dances, those round dances in the dark near the fire, with the drums going, and the strange sounds of the men's voices. The rhythm of the dance comes to life again in Lawrence's account of it:

> What are they doing? Who knows? But perhaps they are giving themselves again to the pulsing, incalculable fall of the blood, which forever seeks to fall to the centre of the earth, while the heart, like a planet pulsating in an orbit, keeps up the strange, lonely circulating of the separate human existence.
>
> But what we seek, passively, in sleep, they perhaps seek actively, in the round dance. It is the homeward pulling of the blood, as the feet fall in the soft heavy rhythm, endlessly. It is the dark blood falling back from the mind, from sight and speech and knowing, back to the great central source where is rest and unspeakable renewal. We whites, creatures of spirit, look upon sleep and see only the dreams that lie as debris of the day, mere hints of wreckage from day-consciousness. We never realize the strange falling back of the dark blood into the downward rhythm, the rhythm of pure forgetting and pure renewal.

I have never cared for the word 'exotic' as an epithet for prose style,

but it seems to me that D. H. Lawrence often used an instrument which is not found elsewhere in English music. Of its beauty and power there can be no question.

I believe that Mr. Evelyn Waugh is largely responsible for the shape that books of travel and adventure have taken since he wrote *Labels* which was published in 1930.—At that date he was already the author of a book on Rossetti which should be more popular than it is, and of the two admirable comic novels, *Decline and Fall* and *Vile Bodies*. *Labels* which was sub-titled "A Mediterranean Journal" is an extremely sophisticated chronicle. There is the same blend of self-mockery and cocksureness and beauty with some really good comic stuff, which was afterwards with the addition of grimmer material to serve Mr. Waugh, Mr. Peter Fleming, and others extremely well. In a few lines Mr. Waugh can get his effect with complete assurance. At Oxford he once paid fifteen shillings for a 'stunt' flight, during which the pilot performed various aerobatics:

> In 'looping,' the aeroplane shoots steeply upwards until the sensation becomes unendurable and one knows that in another moment it will turn completely over. Then it keeps on shooting up and does turn completely over. One looks down into an unfathomable abyss of sky, while over one's head a great umbrella of fields and houses have suddenly opened. Then one shuts one's eyes.

It is Mr. Peter Fleming in his *Brazilian Adventure* who has written the book most representative of the Between-Wars period. None of his later works show the same high spirits or zest for the comic encounter which make this as good a travel book as there is in English. It has the perfect opening for such a crazy enterprise:

> It began with an advertisement in the Agony Column of *The Times*. I always read the Agony Column first, and the news (if there is time) afterwards. This is a practice which most people will deplore, saying that it argues, not only disrespect to a great journal, but an almost impudent lack of curiosity to what are called World Events . . . . The world of the Agony Column is a world of romance, across which sundered lovers are for ever hurrying to familiar rendezvous ('same time, same place'): a world in which jewellery is constantly being left in taxi-cabs with destinations which must surely be compromising: a world of faded and rather desperate gentility, peopled largely by Old Etonians and ladies of title: a world of the most tremendous enterprise, in which Oxford B.A.'s, though equipped only with five European languages, medium height and the ability to drive a car, are ready to 'go anywhere, do anything': a world of sudden and heroic sacrifices ('Owner going abroad'): a world in which every object has a sentimental value, every young man a good appearance, and only the highest references are exchanged: an anxious, urgent, cryptic world: a world in which anything may happen . . . .

Mr. Fleming dared to write an account of a dangerous expedition, deeply tinged with irony and bubbling over with humour which spares neither himself, his companions, nor the people and events of this South American journey. There is an encounter with a wandering Archbishop ('a tall, disconsolate man in a long black robe, violet stockings, and a

kind of gothic bowler hat with a sprig of green stuff tucked jauntily into the band') which is one of the funniest things I have ever read.

Almost as funny and even franker in its implications is Mr. J. R. Ackerley's delicious *Hindoo Holiday*. As far as I know Mr. Ackerley has only published two books, this one and an acutely observed play, *The Prisoners of War*, which deserves a much greater popularity. He went out to a small Indian native state as tutor to the Maharajah's son, a child of two years old, and became the companion and confidant of the peculiar potentate himself, of whom he has painted a picture which manages to be exceedingly funny and very sympathetic.

As outstanding as *Hindoo Holiday*, but dealing with widely different aspects of travel are Dr. F. D. Ommanney's *South Latitude* and *North Cape*. There has never been a better description of Antarctic life than the former. Its author states modestly enough that it is merely a record of personal experiences and is in no sense an official account of the work carried out under the supervision of the "Discovery" Committee on behalf of the Government of the Falkland Islands. What an excellent thing it would be if official accounts of public enterprises were written with the snap and descriptive power, with the artist's feeling and the scientist's precision, which inform Dr. Ommanney's pages. With five other members of a survey party he was stranded on King George Island and his account of this ordeal provides some finely written chapters about a nerve-racking experience.

His second book has not so tremendous a theme. The author signed on as a Deck Hand in one of the Grimsby trawlers and the book is about the hardships and pleasures of the crew. Few men have written with such realism and beauty, of the sea and sailors and ships as Dr. Ommanney has done. He would make the perfect historian of the convoys which have accomplished such magnificent work in the present war.

Two travellers have written memorably about this country during the last decade. Some day justice will be done to the many-sided activities of Sir Arnold Wilson. Soldier, administrator, M.P., expert on a variety of subjects, rear-gunner in the R.A.F. when he met his death, and, above all, a great Christian, Arnold Wilson had the knack of making his countrymen talk. It was his delight to wander about his constituency, entering cottages and inn parlours, and telling the people that he was their Member, with the result that he soon amassed a vast amount of information and anecdote which he used with fine judgment in his *Walks and Talks* and *Thoughts and Talks* books. There is something of Cobbett in the style. It is forthright, like Wilson himself. To meet him before one really got to know him was rather an intimidating experience, so wide was his knowledge, so copious his flow of quotation. I never found its equal in any other man.

City dinners, sermons, famous personalities, chance encounters in public places and railway carriages formed the material for these books. To read them is a challenge. If it be true that there is a gradually rising revolt against present day standards of official and business morality in this country, widespread reading of Wilson's books would hasten its progress considerably. So, I think, would a reading of Mr. J. B. Priestley's *English Journey*. It is my belief that Mr. Priestley is at his best when he writes personally. This book irritated a great many people when it was published. It ought to have made numerous pompous city and town councillors profoundly ashamed of the conditions in the rabbit warrens they administer. In Swindon Mr. Priestley found the Pang Bros., Chinese Laundry. Then:

> The very next shop I came to . . . was one of those hotch potch second-hand establishments you find in these places. One large window was filled with strange musical instruments, not only ukulele banjos and mandolines and flute hummers and the *Kentucky Trap Drum* outfits but also *Real Pigskin Tom-Toms* (Deep Tone) and *Korean Temple Blocks* and *Beaters*; and for a moment I had a wild vision of all the people in these streets, headed by the Pang brothers beating and beating away at these pigskin tom-toms and Korean temple blocks . . .The only other article offered for sale in that street that I noticed was a present for any good child called Jolliboy II Quick-firing Machine Gun (See How Quickly Pellets Are Ejected), and as I walked away I hoped that the jolly boys who played with it would never find themselves caught in the barbed wire with a stream of hot lead disembowelling them. The people who sell that toy might be encouraged to give away with it a few photographs showing what its parent toy can do to a man's guts.

Mr. Priestley made his tour in 1933. He has an eye for the essentials of the national character which few of his contemporaries possess, and he has also a sense of place, which enables him to see and depict the beauties of Bruddersford as easily as the urbanities of Norwich. He frankly admits that he is a little Englander, and he is proud of it too.

It is not often that one sees in conjunction the names of Mr. Somerset Maugham, Mr. Bruce Lockhart, and Mr. Osbert Sitwell. All three have written brilliantly about the East. Mr. Maugham's polished and effective notes on his trips are always delightful to read. Yet I feel that they are not altogether satisfying. Is this because Mr. Maugham is so assiduous in collecting slightly morbid or acid anecdotes with which to salt his traveller's tales? *The Gentlemen in the Parlour* is probably the most highly wrought of them but it is not, in my opinion comparable in merit to Mr. Osbert Sitwell's beautifully written record of journeying from England to China including a trip to Angkor, called *Escape With Me*.

Mr. Bruce Lockhart whose romantic and arduous life has enabled him to write a number of successful 'personal stories' is at his best in *Return to Malaya*. Of course he is a born traveller. He can settle himself in a place as though he was a native of it. He can write with

astonishing frankness about his own private affairs and that is the main reason for the resounding popularity of his books. There is something pleasantly naive about them which saves them from vulgarity. Mr. Lockhart lives and writes with zest. In an anæmic world that is an exceptional and a very welcome quality.

Before Mr. Auden and Mr. Isherwood migrated to the United States, Mr. Isherwood went to Berlin and wrote about it. Afterwards, with Mr. Auden, he went to China and wrote about it. Mr. Auden and Mr. MacNeice went to Iceland and made a Book Society choice but all the same a not very good book out of their trip there. Mr. MacNeice visited the Western Isles and wrote an entertaining book with some good verse in it: *I Crossed The Minch.* A treatise could be written about the architectural travels of Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell. Mr. H. V. Morton, a most capable descriptive journalist and from the box office point of view, the most successful travel writer of the present day, has written widely on biblical and other subjects. Mr. Guedalla has had a word or two to say about South America, and very graphically he has done it. Mr. Aldous Huxley and Mr. Alec Waugh have both written with charm, and discernment about the West Indies and elsewhere in *Beyond the Mexique Bay* and *The Coloured Countries.* Mr. Grahame Greene's *Lawless Roads* gives a haunting picture of Mexico. Among the travel books recently published I think that Mr. Sean O'Faolain's *An Irish Journey* takes a high place. The author knows his country and his countrymen and women really well. His book is as witty, irresponsible, and unexpected as the Irish character is to an Englishman. Mr. O'Faolain makes no attempt to be comprehensive. He went where his will took him and where he hoped to find enjoyment, which he passes on to his readers.

Mr. Clifford Bax has managed to make Essex enchanting in his *Highways and Byways* volume. Sir John Squire is always a companionable writer, and not least so when he is describing his rambles in *The Honeysuckle and the Bee.* Mr. Maurice Collis finds rare material in Burma, and Mr. A. F. Tschiffely is in his element with his legs astride a horse. All these people enjoy doing what they write about. That is one of the charms of contemporary travel books.

It is sad to think that the travel books of the immediate future are likely to be the grimmest that the world has ever read.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

TWO members of the House of Lords publish books that seem to have general value and importance, instructing the nation at a time when guidance is much needed. Lord Strabolgi in *Singapore and After* (Hutchinson, 8s. 6d.) helps a bewildered public to understand the amazing success of the Japanese; his "Study of the Pacific Campaign" shows us at least where he would put the blame. Lord Davies in his book *Facing the Future* (Staples 8s. 6d.), let me say at once, assumes his John Citizen to be the least fastidious kind of reader, such as prefers to hear the Italians called "ice-creamers", and is stimulated to attention by the kind of stories specially devised for platform use. That no doubt is why he writes the sort of stuff which he thinks will be popular—though he knows it would not be good enough for the House of Commons. I wonder whether the average citizen may not be aware that he is being treated with less than respect; Mr. Gladstone never thought it necessary to talk down to him; nor in reality did Mr. Lloyd George, nor does the Prime Minister of to-day. Lord Davies is too modest in believing that his very competent thought needs such tricks to recommend it. I take his book first because its scope is even wider than Lord Strabolgi's and has a more definite purpose. Lord Strabolgi wants us to know why a great section of the World War has gone exceedingly wrong; Lord Davies asks us to consider how we are to make sure that even if we win now there will not be another world war in another generation. What he recommends is nothing less than a Federation of the English-speaking peoples.

Guidance for John Citizen

It is serious thought, set out by a man, who knows thoroughly how political institutions work in our democracy. 'John Citizen' must often find that the candidate who represents his wishes in domestic affairs is dead against them in the international sphere. Yet there is a way out, and America has used it; Switzerland uses it; there is the referendum. We have all heard that the Peace Ballot organized in 1935 by the League of Nations Union was a main reason why the British Government went in for "appeasing" Italy and Germany; but Lord Davies points out that in the ballot "seven million votes went for joint military and naval action by the members of the League against any aggressor." If that policy had been acted on, if a force of some fifty thousand aeroplanes had been kept ready at the League's orders, there would, he holds, have been no second European war. The League was paralysed, for several causes, but chiefly because in the democracies those political leaders who were ready for this international policing stood also for domestic policies which did not find favour with the electorate. Lord Davies is clear that there must be this police force, but that it will be useless unless those who control it are so organized as to keep their function distinct and

separate. It lies outside the ordinary routine of national existence, which the ordinary political institutions deal with. But if a man attempts to rob another in the street, ordinary citizens interfere as a matter of course, calling in the police, and helping them, not out of chivalry, but because it is to the interest of all that the peace shall be kept. Most definitely Lord Davies looks to the ordinary citizen rather than to governments for the world's improvement. Whatever authority is to control foreign policy and military action must be amenable to an electorate voting specially on these subjects. If I understand him rightly, this electorate would be spread over all the British dominions and would vote as a unit. This is a first step, but in his ideal, the electorate would take in, or rather be merged into, the entire English-speaking community. Such an electorate would have immense power, and he goes so far as to propose that no one should have the privilege of voting in it except after a qualifying test. How and where this new form of degree is to be taken, he does not specify and he is wise; no other proposal in his book seems so likely to make readers hostile and sceptical.

They will be impressed by his examination of the case of Poland, which to-day has all our sympathy; yet in fact during the era of the League of Nations, Poland showed a fine contempt for international legality; it seized Vilna, it seized a slice of White Russia, and later still it grabbed Teschen from the Czechs. There was no effective international Court or police force to restrain these actions, and the result of them left Poland dangerously isolated in the community of nations. What Lord Davies wants is "an international Magna Carta" in which the rights of nations as nations will be affirmed, and the duties of nations to maintain those rights will be defined. Inevitably he wants an Imperial War Council—such as Mr. Lloyd George set up in the last war—a precedent not followed in this one.

Briefly the book is a plea for a better organized unity—first of the English-speaking world, and finally of civilization. Individual nationalities will need to give up some of their unchartered freedom—of which Eire gives an edifying example. The unity is not only needed for police purposes; Whether individually or collectively, the nations must organize against economic perils; and he quotes the German labour training corps as "the only good thing he saw there." Half a year or a whole year for everyone, spent on "some useful manual work", instead of conscription, is his prescription.

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Manchuria and After

Lord Strabolgi's book might serve Lord Davies for a complete example of what may happen when a piece of international aggression is condoned. Japan's annexation of Manchuria and of two purely Chinese provinces in 1931 was acquiesced in by the civilized world, though manifestly "a violation of the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations." But no steps were taken on behalf of the League, until 1932 when Japanese troops attacked the Chinese in Greater Shanghai, outside the International Settlement. This action—which directly threatened interests other than the Chinese—was denounced by resolution and the Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops from the last occupation. But the whole question of Japanese action in China was now before the League, and the Commission of Enquiry set up under Lord Lytton condemned the invasion of Manchuria. Lord Strabolgi takes seriously the intimation then given by Mr. Stimson (the Secretary of State), that if economic sanctions

were applied, the United States would join in them. Unfortunately however the fall of the Labour Government removed from office Mr. Henderson, "the most enlightened Foreign Secretary that the British parliamentary system had known for half a century." Lord Davies's John Citizen would be interested by this appraisement, coming from a hereditary peer, trained from boyhood in the Royal Navy. Lord Simon, who replaced Mr. Henderson when the Coalition Government was formed, may serve as an excellent example of those who work for the traditions of secret diplomacy and keep John Citizen well away from contact with the controls. When the proposal for economic sanctions came before the League, "the chief Japanese delegate excused himself from making any defence, as he could not do it better than Sir John Simon had already done."

Next came the case of Abyssinia, and the same personages were in control of Government policy. After that, Austria and the Czechs were separately looted without concerted opposition from the nations that looked on. Then came Poland, and opposition was not only threatened but declared. Yet by this time Lord Strabolgi holds that the "Maginot mentality" was well developed, and when Poland was attacked the united power of France and England failed to establish a second front. Nor in his opinion were the necessary risks by the democracies taken when Germany plunged into a Russian campaign.

Even in the Far East, where on the face of things America, Great Britain and China should have been more than a match for Japan, the English-speaking powers played for safety. America put her navy at Hawaii to be well out of danger, when its effective station should have been on the high seas, farther east. Pearl Harbour followed and after it the American navy certainly took a long time to recover neither it nor the British could offer effective help to the valiant Dutch—so Java fell. Singapore fell in Lord Strabolgi's view, because the British government had neglected to form a local force, for which more than two million Chinese were available in Malaya, to say nothing of the Malays themselves. His book does not make cheerful reading: how should it? but he holds that when a resolute offensive is adopted, striking north from Australia and south from the Asiatic mainland, Japan must fall. For the present, she owes her success to "a new technique of using massed skirmishers for widespread infiltration purposes." But that is a game at which two can play, and "the young Englishman, Scotsman, Welshman, and not less the Irishman, usually shows great power of initiative, until he comes under barrack square influence."

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Looking at England

Those who value the memory of Irish regiments will value the addition in that last sentence. I am not sure that they would include Mrs. Nesca A. Robb; her book, *An Ulsterwoman in England, 1924-1941* (Cambridge University Press 8s. 6d.) has enthusiastic reference to the Ulster Division but shows no sign of knowledge that another Irish Division fought side by side with it. However the book's purpose is to tell us what she felt about England, which she watched in critical years with the sense of separateness that Ulster shares with the mere Irish. Her record really begins with Munich—the "Crisis" of September, 1938—and she describes "exultancy of relief" which followed it—"not without a small bitter residue of shame." Many of us were more aware of the shame than of the exultancy. But her finding is that England

in those days wanted peace at any price. "Lord Baldwin," she says, "has been held up to much obloquy for his confession that in 1934 he withheld the truth about the European situation because he knew that to tell it would mean losing the election." I cannot myself recall this utterance, and in such a case words should be quoted: but "Ulsterwoman" goes on to assert that the British public was not less to blame than its Prime Minister. This is singular thinking. If Lord Baldwin said what she asserts he did, he stated a definite fact—to wit, that he deliberately failed to call on the people for sacrifices. We are in quite another order of ideas when we assume that the people would have refused to make them. In point of fact it was not the British public who shirked; it was the political leaders. Oddly enough the best part of this book will be found in its references to Italy; Mrs. Robb has real feeling for the Italians. Her account of London under the *blitz* does not add much to what we all know and admire; but she justly points out the danger which has followed from England's "rooted distrust of any kind of mental activity." Germans, Italians and Japanese do not share it; and we see the deplorable consequences when the best brains in England (and there are none better) are called in, too late.

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Regional Novelists

Miss Phyllis Bentley has a pleasant theme when she writes on *The English Regional Novel* in the series of P.E.N. books (Allan and Unwin 2s.) She opens with an argument to show why two English cities separated by only a few hours' railway travel may be fundamentally much more unlike each other than American cities two or three thousand miles apart. Their local character was formed in the many centuries when, for instance, York was four or five days travel from London. Again, the country itself has an admirable variety of landscape and geographic character. It was the Brontës who set the example of exploiting this local distinctness—both of scene and of character. Miss Bentley does not stop to observe that "the Scotch novels," as the "Waverleys" used to be called, had given a clear lead—for she thinks this is national rather than regional. At all events, the regional novel began with Yorkshire and has continued to flourish there. In the list of novelists arranged county by county there are no less than sixteen names for Yorkshire including her own: no other region claims more than four. One may agree that Yorkshire is specially conscious of its own distinctness; a Yorkshire man or woman will soon let any new acquaintance know where they hail from. Yet that is just as true of Devonshire—and we have only three Devonian names, of whom Hardy figures against several shires. Has she not forgotten Charles Kingsley? She pays tribute to Trollope for having created through "imaginary topography" a regionalism of his own in "Barsetshire", somewhere in the south-west, yet not to my thinking regional in the same real sense as George Eliot's work or Hardy's. It is amusing to read, on the matter of using dialect, that George Eliot felt herself "constantly checked by the artistic duty of being generally intelligible." What progress we have made, to be sure! How many writers, both in prose and in verse have spat upon all inartistic subservience to this contemptible end! Let me hasten to say that Miss Bentley, at all events as a writer of criticism, is admirably clear

CONDITIONS OF PEACE, by E. H. Carr. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

A Daniel come to judgment! Professor Carr, by his shrewd analysis of the *Twenty Years' Crisis* published in the autumn of 1939, performed a useful service in puncturing the bright-hued balloons of British idealism; at the same time he laid himself open to the charge of being a purely negative critic. In his new book, though the note of realism is still conspicuous, that faintly acrid tone, which had the stamp of the Foreign Office about it, is no longer heard. The author has mellowed, and the result is a compelling and constructive design for twentieth-century living which stands by itself in contemporary writings on public affairs.

Professor Carr's purpose is unambiguous. Sadly conscious of the mistakes and shortcomings of Versailles—he was a member of the Foreign Office delegation at the Peace Conference—he wants us first to appreciate fully what went wrong in the inter-War period and why—and, then, lest war-weariness again set in, to direct our minds now to the shape of things to come. "Much will depend," as he says, "on the existence of a government ready to give a clear and decisive lead": and the book is a call for such leadership.

What is to be the goal of our endeavour? The conventional answer would be peace, that is freedom from fear—or security, that is freedom from want. These things, however, the author reminds us, are static aims, and therefore apt to be overborne by the stream of life. Indeed, the very condition of security is continuous advance. First, then, we have to understand the salient characteristic of the times we live in. It is a revolt against the three predominant ideas of the nineteenth century: liberal democracy, national self-determination and laissez-faire economics.

These themes are the substance of Part I of *Conditions of Peace.* Professor Carr shows us how the "democracy" which emerged from the centuries-old struggle with feudalism was rooted in certain conditions which have now passed away. It meant—and still means in all the text-books—a society organized to make the world safe for the property-holder. But latter-day economic developments, and the rise of the masses to power, have made nonsense of such dogmas. Democracy needs to be re-defined as "a system of government based on political rights valid not merely against military, but against economic, power." Sir Stafford Cripps made the point, somewhat timidly, in his recent broadcast; and, incidentally the success of Independent candidates is a manifest reaction against "the supremacy of the party machine dominated by economic interest which has become the conspicuous feature of our political life." Self-determination, likewise, has up to now been interpreted exclusively in the nineteenth-century setting of political rights. And, naturally, it has come more and more into conflict with the realities of military and economic power. This can be remedied, however, if we are careful to distinguish the principle of self-determination from that of nationality—to give up the idea, born of the French Revolution, that nation and state should normally coincide. Men may "determine" themselves, as we are reminded, "into larger as readily as into smaller units"; it is all a matter of combining different loyalties according to different purposes. The first thing is to establish securely the broader military and economic framework.

What is no less important, and deserving of emphasis, both for democracy and for national self-determination, is the need for

obligations in correlation with rights. Social obligations will be an essential factor, too, in the new economic democracy. It has been neglected in our generation, and in the last century, because most of us, consciously or unconsciously, accepted the doctrine of the harmony of interests. The bankruptcy of that doctrine was a major theme of Professor Carr's last book. Because, however, we have not yet discovered a comparable basic assumption of the coming age, our fundamental problem to-day is one of moral purpose. The moral crisis persists. Chapter 5, analysing the elements of the new faith with which alone we shall win through, is perhaps the most effective—and surprising—of the book.

In Part II, which deals with "Outlines of Policy", although the author time and again insists on the tentative nature of his conclusions, they are, to my mind, completely sound. He makes out a convincing case for beginning the "revolution" at home. Big changes are necessary in British domestic policy—and the war, of course, has provided the great opportunity for them. He touches lightly on such subjects as public works, the social minimum and the need for subsidizing consumption—to the end that the essentials of national housekeeping, food, housing, clothing, fuel—are really treated as a national responsibility. He does not despair of satisfactory collaboration with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. after the war. But he is insistent, and rightly so, that, as geography ordains, it is Britain who must take the lead in Europe, who must shoulder the chief responsibility for effective operation of the European Planning Authority and ancillary Commissions which will be required.

All this is, necessarily, sketchy—and the chapter on Germany certainly does not probe deep enough, though one must agree that the important thing is to give the Germans an interest in—and a share of reponsibility for—the new Europe. But the book as a whole exhibits a healthy distrust of blue prints of any kind and bears witness to the essential truth that the conduct of the war and the making of the peace are not distinct and contradictory operations but are part and parcel of the same process.

W. Horsfall Carter.

INTELLECTUAL AMERICA, by Oscar Cargill. *Macmillan.* 21*s.*

In a review of Mr. H. L. Mencken's *Notes on Democracy* Mr. Walter Lippmann urged that the book should be judged "totally, roughly, approximately, without definition, as you would a barrage of artillery, for the general destruction rather than for the accuracy of the shots." I pass on this order of the day, for which I am indebted to Mr. Cargill himself, to all readers about to subject themselves to the Cargill barrage. If they will follow it faithfully, they will find the main body of their perplexities about American contemporary culture gradually succumbing to the quick-firing Cargill anecdote and the really heavy guns of Cargill erudition, though remaining unscathed by many of the wilder shots.

To drop the metaphor—there are things in this volume which will annoy the critical reader. Mr. Cargill's portentous words, his echolalia and aposiopetic and moniliform, are a bore because they obscure rather than reveal, and some of his fundamental *dicta* similarly darken counsel. To say that the modern mind was formed between 1850 and 1870 and then entitle one whole section of modern American culture *The Freudians* seems a contradiction in terms. Then, Mr. Cargill has no good words for

British writers after 1870, and few for those before; all, all are "tame and imitative." Mass execution on this scale is never endearing, and when it is supported by such assertions as that *John Bull's Other Island* is one of Shaw's most popular productions and that MacLeish's *Hamlet* surpasses Shakespeare's in several important particulars, the lion may be excused if he twitch his too long-suffering tail. But these are the mere jocular flourishes of long-standing and mutually respecting fencers; more serious is the Cargill fetish of "indebtedness". In Mr. Cargill's eye every writer resembles some other writer; and really these resemblances are fetched too far. Pearl Buck suggests Zola, Lytton Strachey is derived from Frank Harris, Hart Crane's "benzine rinsings from the moon" is an "echo" of Poe's "opiate vapour, dewy and dim." With an eye attentive to resemblances" is too much the operative clause throughout this book.

The European reader may tend at first, too, to be impatient at the devotion of so much space to accounts of French and German and English thought, which seems to delay the writer from his theme. But such impatience is not Mr. Cargill's fault, for he announces his aim, and the structure of his book, clearly enough in his foreword. Defining an ideology as an agglutinated and powerful collection of ideas as opposed to that individual orderly system of thought which is a philosophy—an admirable distinction—he proposes to study the impact of the prevailing ideologies since 1850 on the American mind, with its result in the contemporary product of American culture. After a sketch of the "invading forces" of foreign thought, therefore, Mr. Cargill deals comprehensively with contemporary American writers under the "ideological" headings: Naturalists, Decadents, Primitivists, Intelligentzia and Freudians. One does not always agree with his classifications, naturally; Santayana does not seem to me a Naturalist, Bierce a member of the Intelligentzia or Hemingway a Primitivist; Faulkner and Caldwell strike us here as conditioned by the South in a way which Mr. Cargill does not indicate; *Judgment Day* is surely not an appendage to the story of Studs Lonigan but its climax, its inevitable tragic close. And so on. But Mr. Cargill is sensible and generous in his interpretation of labels, and to have a classification attempted at all is a great step forward. The significance to American literature of such facts as the loss of sea power in the Civil War, the establishment of "tourist third" on Transatlantic liners, the arrival of the frontier at the Pacific in 1849 and the invention of car and radio, is perceived and clarified, for which one is very grateful.

Mr. Cargill's literary knowledge is without any doubt enormous. For its biographies of contemporary writers alone—always a difficult matter to secure while the writer is still alive—this volume is very valuable. At a rough calculation, more than a hundred American writers are dealt with in the course of the text. Mr. Cargill has not only read everything they have ever written but everything anybody has ever written about them; he has thus an enormous store of entertaining anecdote with which to illuminate their minds and lives.

The second volume of this work will deal with *Ideas in Conflict*, where we shall meet the "stabilizers and mobilizers" respectively, in the great conflict for social democracy which Mr. Cargill sees as ranging from 1850 to the present day.

To sum up, the present volume, though unnecessarily long—for

readers of such a work do not need plot summaries of famous novels or translations of famous poems—is a mine of information, and a warm-hearted, vigorous, often penetrating attempt to systematize modern American literature. The author's description of his work as a cornucopia, with the great plenty of contemporary American writing gushing from it joyously, is thoroughly justified.

PHYLLIS BENTLEY.

MODERN BRITAIN, 1870-1939, by D. C. Somervell. *Methuen.* 6*s.*

BRITAIN AGAINST NAPOLEON, by Carola Oman. *Faber & Faber.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

MY EARLY LIFE, by Winston S. Churchill. *Macmillan.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

All these three books are good examples of different historical methods successfully adopted. Mr. Somervell's work, in spite of its new found dignity of 'library edition,' is a text book for students; Miss Oman writes for a wider audience although the romance of the incidents she describes is sufficiently well documented to attract the serious reader who is anxious to obtain a general impression of the period; Mr. Churchill, in a volume which was first published twelve years ago, is himself, a good historian, a fine writer, and a first-rate narrator of personal adventures. It is an interesting thought that in the present Prime Minister and the present Archbishop of Canterbury we have two of the ablest journalists of the age.

Anyone, like Mr. Somervell, who undertakes to bring history up-to-date leaves himself wide open to attack. One reader at least must confess himself amazed at the justification submitted for the South African war. Unless I construe him incorrectly (page 52) Great Britain declared war in order to prove to Canada, Australia and New Zealand "growing into nationhood" that mother's apron strings were better than independence. Such a statement seems appallingly cynical and on the whole rather unlike Mr. Sovervell who maintains a very fair balance despite a certain lack of sympathy with the politics of the left. It is difficult to be free from bias even in a text book and I hesitate to praise wholeheartedly a history which gives the student so little cause for uneasiness or so little incentive to greater effort.

Nevertheless the book is both good and interesting. It relates facts neatly and with effective emphasis, while it draws attention to the kind of domestic detail, which previously school history books have largely ignored. It is good for instance to see the work of Miss Buss of the North London Collegiate School and Miss Beale of The Cheltenham Ladies' College given rightful prominence.

There certainly is an odd resemblance, as Miss Oman points out, between the condition of the people of Great Britain to-day and their forefathers 130 years ago. For Hitler read Napoleon, for Home Guard read Volunteers; the same tremors about invasion; evacuation plans; "The Russians were retiring in good order before a force three times their number. Bonaparte (Hitler) had left a shattered Smolensk, and was following the line of the Russian retirement towards Moscow." And this despairing cry from Mrs. Piozzi, Dr. Johnson's old friend, has a familiar ring: "We have no Cook."

As a general rule I like my history plain, free that is from the inventive genius of writers who put into the mouths of characters thoughts which may or may not have been theirs. (To say nothing of paint-

ing in the backcloth of an imaginary scene). But Miss Oman has a way with her. She causes the reader's imagination to travel with her as she arranges the coloured pieces of her story with expert hands. *Britain Against Napoleon* is a valuable book as well as entertaining and it is easily read.

The adventures of young Churchill are a necessary introduction to a proper understanding of the character of the Prime Minister. Some astonishing facts emerge, not least of all the failure of Harrow to discover his genius, leaving him to begin his education when he started seriously to read (when not playing polo) while a subaltern in India. Mr. Churchill made the most of his opportunities in his early life and did not shrink from creating the opportunities for himself. Persistence enabled him to take part in the action in the Mamund Valley on the Indian frontier and later, in spite of Kitchener's reluctance to have him there, he was to charge with the cavalry in the battle of Omdurman in the Soudan. His political career was undoubtedly helped by the glamour which attached to his adventures in the South African war and at this time he was always seeking for experience and adventure. He certainly got both. *My Early Life* is history at first hand, written by one who profited by his experiences in more ways than one. It is a great book because it is stamped (as an autobiography should be) with the character of the author, and at the same time it is a brilliant and compelling chronicle of historical events.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

BORDERLINE RUSSIA, by H. Foster Anderson. *Cresset Press.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

This is an extraordinarily interesting and valuable book, for its author has not only had a long and intimate experience of the countries he describes, but he is palpably a philosopher with a remarkable eye for what is under the surface of things.

A vivid account of life as the manager of a great Russian estate before 1914 is followed by the tale of his life among the Baltic peoples. His participation in the last war, at Gallipoli and in Flanders, he barely mentions. From his headquarters at Riga, where he became a member of a most exclusive club, one where Balts and patricians would congregate, he conducted the business of a timber agent until conditions changed and he returned to Russia. He was to go to that country at various intervals subsequently and what he has to say of the Russians is thus of considerable importance. For instance when the British Embassy had been withdrawn and a Canadian in Moscow had urged him not to risk a journey down the Volga he found, on the contrary, that the Russians were most helpful. They all seemed to know about the break in diplomatic representation, but this they regarded more in sorrow than in anger.

> They appeared touched that I should come all the way to see them, for they were terribly proud of the U.S.S.R. . . . so the grand generosity of the Russian in Tzarist days had not been due to riches. The habit of being 'large' in all their dealings was and is inherent in the Russian.

Throughout this book we find the most enlightening pieces of observation. In the summer of 1939 when the author was at Berlin on the way to eastern Europe he met a German whom he knew. 'If we lose this war,' said the German, 'we shall pray for the Paradise of the Versailles Treaty.' And when for

the first time Mr. Anderson goes to Warsaw he finds that the Poles do not come up to his preconceived notions of them, for although he knew that they were Slavs yet his eyes said that they looked like Tynesiders, tough and alert. He says:

> By accepted standards Poland was not a democracy. Yet she struck the first blow in the struggle for the regeneration of democracy that had lost its spiritual force.

It is very satisfactory to learn that when in Vilna at a peculiarly critical time, in charge of a relief mission from Britain for Polish refugees, the author found that fundamentally there was great kindliness on the part of the Lithuanians, despite all the agitations of the past; this augurs well for the future of these neighbouring people. It may even be that the personal union of the Middle Ages will again be brought about in the new Europe. There are memorable pictures, sharp-edged and epigrammatic of the Finns, Swedes and others with whom the author came into more than momentary contact.

How touching it is to read of the Poles that

> never during the darkest hours of these days did I once hear a Pole regret the decision his people had made in facing Hitler nor a doubt that victory would be achieved.

It is difficult to stop quoting from this fascinating book. At Vladivostok the author and his wife visited the State Bank, where they saw several hundred women employed. The men had all been taken for the army. 'The hills around invited excursions, but the strategical importance of Vladivostok would have made the most innocent walk take on another meaning, so we confined ourselves to the town.' And finally:

> I felt that the U.S.S.R. was much quieter than in the years when loud speakers on the squares and posters on the walls told of great plans. But behind the silence there were signs of almost feverish activity.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

OF MEN AND WOMEN, by Pearl Buck. *Methuen.* 6*s.*

The wood of war-time publishing, however sparse the great trees, pullulates with little books on large subjects. Most valuable when most personal, they can play the part of a good conversation, stimulating us to look again at something familiar. Their weakness is that they are bound to over-simplify. They impose a shape whose dim lines are barely discernible, they force a conclusion that has not yet arrived. For you cannot have loose ends in little books, and a little book that really took account of its subject might turn out to be no more than a loose beginning.

All the same, for our preoccupied days, the little book distilled by a lively mind from a rich experience is apt reading. Mrs. Buck has a clear and lively mind, and a rich experience of two civilizations, Chinese and American. What she has to say about the lives of women in both countries is worth a hearing. She sketches the two contrasting civilizations. The Chinese woman, until lately confined to her home, uneducated except by family life, debarred from taking any part in politics, the professions or business, but not from marriage and childbearing since polygamy and the parents' care assured to every woman a husband and a home. She traces the painful and difficult adjustments that followed the government's recent decision to emancipate women and establish monogamy, and mentions that since the war the Chinese have returned to a modified

polygamy, as in some degree every country does in war-time, love growing more imperious and reckless of consequences in the face of so much death.

Mrs. Buck loves China and admires the Chinese women. She writes with much less sympathy of the woman of America. Theoretically a daughter of liberty, a free, educated citizen of a democratic country, she is actually, in Mrs. Buck's view, a spoilt creature who spends her life eating her cake and having it, who demands at once the privileges of the kept woman and of the equal citizen, and who is often unconsciously disliked by the man who earns the money to pay for her manicures and for her lecture tickets and library subscriptions. For the American woman, Mrs. Buck wants fewer privileges, more justice. I think that she concentrates too much on one class of American woman, and does not fully appreciate how far the basis of their problem is the injustice of the whole economic system—but a good many of the things that she has to say about the relationship of men and women in work outside the house are shrewd and worth hearing.

She draws a sharp distinction between 'femininity' and real womanhood, and sees that the great hindrance to a full and satisfying life of men and women side by side in the world and in the home, is the fear of losing something. The man is afraid of losing prestige and power based on administrative and economic superiority. The woman is afraid of losing his love and protection.

I am not sure that I agree altogether with Mrs. Buck's attempt at solution. I am sure that she is right in saying that it lies somewhere in education, but I believe that she starts too late with the Kindergarten. It is in the very early years of emotional development that the really free man or woman is made, and it would seem that parents would have to be educated first to give the baby boy or girl the right start towards confident, generous and unashamed woman or manhood. But I am sure that she is right in her main conclusion.

"If," she says, "a woman is a real woman no kind of work can spoil her quality. For the real, female quality is something tough and strong and resistant," and out of the strong comes forth sweetness."

LETTICE COOPER.

FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE: Reflections and Reminiscences, by Dr. Milan Hodza. *Jarrolds.* 18*s.*

A GERMAN PROTECTORATE: the Czechs under Nazi rule, by Sheila Grant Duff. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

In *Federation in Central Europe,* Dr. Milan Hodza, one-time Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, tells of his life's work as a statesman both in the old Habsburg Monarchy and in the post-last-war Czechoslovak Republic. It is therefore to some extent a personal story, but it is also much more than this, for Dr. Hodza explains three things which our peacemakers should know when, after the allied victory in this war, they come to the difficult and vital problem of the Danubian region. He tells of the various ideas which were put forward before the last war for solving the "Austrian" (which meant, in those days, the "Danubian") problem by means of federation, and explains how the failure to reach a federative solution led to the break-up of the Habsburg Empire; he shows how Czechoslovakia was destroyed because of the impact of the new German Im-

perialism of the Nazi dynamic upon a Central Europe divided against itself; and he outlines a practical after-the-war scheme for bringing together in federation the various countries of the Danubian basin.

Both in his recapitulation of the past and in this planning for the future, Dr. Hodza renders the service of making it clear that only by federative means will Danubian Europe be able to preserve itself against the aggression of predatory Great Powers, and thereby save Europe as a whole from another conflagration. Dr. Hodza's scheme for Central European Federation is one which should recommend itself to the statesmen of Western Europe, both because it is workable, thought out by a statesman and economist of great practical experience and not just the "paper" scheme of a theoretician; and because what he suggests for Central Europe might well become the blue print of wider federative schemes.

Miss Sheila Grant Duff's *A German Protectorate* gives a picture of the conditions which prevail in German-occupied Czechoslovakia—and this brings home not only the horrors of Nazi "slave state" idea in actual practice but the realization also that unless there is in the future a constructive solution of the Danubian problem, such as that advocated by Dr. Hodza, or something like it, there will always be the dire alternative of a repetition of the Central European tragedy which is mirrored in the conditions in Czechoslovakia to-day.

Miss Grant Duff has taken as her main sources the administrative acts of the German rulers of the Czech protectorate, statements and declarations of Nazi politicians and officials and articles in the German and German controlled press. Out of their own mouths the Germans stand condemned.

Miss Grant Duff has an exceptional knowledge and experience of Czech affairs, gained at first hand as a correspondent in the country, and this forms the background of the material she had collected and collated of conditions in the Czech lands under the Nazi tyrant. Her careful marshalling of hard facts gives a better idea than any more polemical method could possibly do of the systematic German attempt to reduce the Czechs to the level of a slave people and eventually to obliterate their very nationhood.

I would strongly advise all students of international affairs to read both these books. That of Miss Grant Duff is the factual record of the present German infamy in Hitler's first European "colony." That of Dr. Hodza is at once an historic explanation of how such a state of affairs came about through the lack in the past of a real Central European organization and an indication as to how such an essential organization may be brought about in the future. Reading the two together brings the whole picture into focus.

C. F. MELVILLE.

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